Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity by Rendleman, Doug
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to 
Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity 
Doug Rendleman 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, rendlemand@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, 
Litigation Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Doug Rendleman, Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop Illegal Executive 
Branch Activity, 91 U. Colo. L. Rev. 887 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020 5:12 PM 
 
PRESERVING THE NATIONWIDE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION 
TO STOP ILLEGAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
ACTIVITY 
DOUG RENDLEMAN* 
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History became legend. Legend became myth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When someone successfully sues a federal executive branch 
official for violating federal law, the federal court’s remedy, 
which can be a nationwide national government injunction, 
thrusts the court into controversial territory. Critics maintain 
that courts grant too many broad nationwide injunctions against 
the executive branch. They state a myriad of reasons to oppose 
nationwide injunctions: The federal court, they write, lacks au-
thority, power, or jurisdiction to grant a national government 
injunction. National government injunctions, they continue, en-
courage plaintiffs to forum shop. Moreover, multiple lawsuits 
create a risk that different courts will grant conflicting injunc-
tions. They politicize the judiciary and prevent issues from 
percolating in the federal courts. The injunctions distort the op-
eration of precedent. Critics maintain that a national 
government injunction creates asymmetry. National govern-
ment injunctions, critics argue, benefit nonparties—people who 
are not plaintiffs. Finally, critics protest that one trial judge 
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should not grant an injunction that halts the whole federal ex-
ecutive branch of the United States government. 
This Article disagrees with critics of national government 
injunctions. It presents reasons for broad injunctions and favors 
a federal judge’s ability to grant a nationwide national govern-
ment injunction if needed to protect plaintiffs’ rights and to 
suppress defendants’ lawbreaking. This Article is based on a pro-
fessional critique of courts and judges that aspires for neutral 
judicial decisions grounded on established principles; it is quali-
fied by the realism of partisan judicial appointments, coupled 
with plaintiffs’ wide choices of forum. This Article maintains 
that critics’ arguments are incorrect, unconvincing, overstated, 
or true only some of the time. 
Examining the breadth of the federal courts’ injunctions 
against unlawful executive activity will lead this Article through 
complex and uncertain territory. After this Introduction, Part I 
examines the constitutional framework for national government 
injunctions. Constitutional issues include separation of powers 
and judicial review. Part II discusses the procedure and reme-
dies that are involved in a national government injunction. It is 
followed by Part III, which discusses the threats President 
Trump poses to separation of powers and judicial review. 
Part IV examines and answers critics’ arguments against 
the nationwide national government injunction. It analyzes fed-
eral court authority under the headings of subject matter juris-
diction and equitable jurisdiction. It concludes that a federal 
district judge has authority and subject matter jurisdiction to 
grant plaintiffs an injunction that bars the federal executive 
from implementing an unconstitutional or illegal federal govern-
ment program anywhere in the United States. The judge also 
has equitable jurisdiction to choose an injunction and equitable 
discretion to shape it. 
Critics have not examined the federal courts’ procedure 
carefully enough. Part V discusses federal courts’ regular proce-
dure, including filtering techniques, checks against possible mis-
takes, and grants of complete relief to victims of improper 
executive branch measures. Federal litigation procedures in-
clude principles of confinement and injunction drafting that 
should check abuses. 
When this Article says that national government injunction 
lawsuits will be litigated in the regular way, it does not mean 
that courts will follow ordinary procedures. Deference to the ex-
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ecutive branch defendant requires special judicial handling: 
something between ordinary and extraordinary treatment. 
When the federal courts apply the procedural techniques they 
have been using, and perhaps others suggested below, the pro-
cedure is satisfactory to support a nationwide injunction against 
a lawbreaking executive branch defendant. No other limitations 
are needed or appropriate. 
This Article concludes that if the federal courts develop, ap-
ply, and mold important procedure, equitable filters, and princi-
ples of confinement, a federal court may protect plaintiffs’ rights 
by granting a nationwide national government injunction 
against an executive branch defendant’s improper activity. 
This Article expresses a sense of urgency about the federal 
courts’ role in curbing the Trump Administration’s improper 
measures. It combines opposition to the incumbent President 
with respect for the federal courts. 
Trump v. Hawaii concerned complex litigation about the 
Trump Administration’s third ban on Muslim immigration.2 The 
district court judge disapproved the ban and granted plaintiffs a 
preliminary injunction with nationwide effect. The Supreme 
Court majority decided that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits, reversed the preliminary in-
junction, and remanded “for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.”3 The majority wrote: “Our disposition of the case 
[reversing the lower court’s preliminary injunction] makes it un-
necessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope of 
the injunction issued by the District Court.”4 
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas set up the open 
issues that this Article examines: the breadth and scope of the 
injunction that might have followed plaintiffs’ success. In her 
dissent, Justice Sotomayor took the position on the injunction’s 
scope that this Article supports: 
 Because the majority concludes that plaintiffs have failed 
to show a likelihood of success on the merits, it takes no po-
sition on the propriety of the nationwide scope of the 
injunction issued by the District Court. The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by granting nationwide relief. 
Given the nature of the Establishment Clause violation and 
 
 2.  138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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the unique circumstances of this case, the imposition of a na-
tionwide injunction was necessary to provide complete relief 
to the plaintiffs.5 
Justice Thomas disagreed. His concurring opinion took the 
position that this Article seeks to refute:  
 Merits aside, I write separately to address the remedy that 
the plaintiffs sought and obtained in this case. . . .  
 I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to en-
ter universal injunctions. 
 . . . .  
 . . . [R]ecently, they have exploded in popularity.  
 . . . .  
 In sum, universal injunctions are legally and historically 
dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them, this court is 
duty bound to adjudicate their authority to do so.6 
In late January 2020, Justice Gorsuch agreed with Justice 
Thomas. In Department of Homeland Security v. New York, the 
Court, in a five to four decision, stayed a preliminary injunction 
that forbade enforcement of the Trump Administration’s “public 
charge” rule on immigration.7 Justice Gorsuch’s concurring 
opinion turned to the nationwide national government 
injunction: 
When a district court orders the government not to enforce a 
rule against the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court re-
dresses the injury that gives rise to its jurisdiction in the first 
place. But when a court goes further than that, ordering the 
government to take (or not take) some action with respect to 
those who are strangers to the suit, it is hard to see how the 
 
 5. Id. at 2446 n.13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2423 (majority 
opinion); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Id. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 7. 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).  
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court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving cases 
and controversies.8 
The reasons Justice Gorsuch gave align with critics’ arguments. 
As the Justices’ contrasting opinions reveal, when a federal 
court strikes down a federal executive branch initiative, the 
court’s authority to grant a national government injunction and 
the size and breadth of that injunction are controversial. The 
controversy stems from the remedial technique the federal 
courts use to stop or limit executive officials from continuing 
statutory and constitutional violations. The dispute focuses 
more narrowly on injunctions federal courts have granted in the 
past and continue to grant on more recent injunctions aimed at 
curbing the Trump Administration’s excessive exercises of exec-
utive power.  
 The injunction we are examining has several names, in-
cluding “nationwide injunction” and “universal injunction.”9 
Justice Thomas, as quoted above, and scholar-critic Howard 
Wasserman say “universal,”10 a designation not yet tested 
against a NASA astronaut in the International Space Station. 
The term this Article uses is “national government injunction,” 
sometimes “nationwide national government injunction”: na-
tionwide defines the injunction’s breadth and the defendant is 
the national government. 
Judges and professors have opposed broad injunctions.11 
The Attorney General has instructed United States attorneys to 
 
 8. Id. at 600 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined the concurring 
opinion. 
 9. Professor Amanda Frost and others use the term “nationwide injunction.” 
See Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 
1071 (2018) (“This Article uses the term ‘nationwide injunction’ to refer to an 
injunction at any stage of the litigation that bars the defendant from taking action 
against individuals who are not parties to the lawsuit in a case that is not brought 
as a class action.”); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 
TEX. L. REV. 67 (2019). 
 10. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring); Howard M. 
Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They 
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 338 (2018). 
 11. Scholarly opposition began right away. The first skeptical article was 
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers 
of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017), which was followed by Samuel 
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 417 (2017). Other critical and skeptical articles followed. See, e.g., Ronald A. 
Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum-Shopping, Politicizing 
Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020); Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 
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oppose nationwide injunctions.12 In Make the Road New York v. 
McAleenan, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson criticized the Trump 
Administration’s arguments to restrict national government in-
junctions: “[I]t reeks of bad faith, demonstrates contempt for the 
authority that the Constitution’s Framers have vested in the ju-
dicial branch, and, ultimately, deprives successful plaintiffs of 
the full measure of the remedy to which they are entitled.”13 In 
addition, Professor Suzette Malveaux, Professor Amanda Frost, 
and others are not opposed to broad injunctions.14 This Article 
takes a more traditional, yet more activist, position in agreeing 
with those professors’ general position. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION 
A. Judicial Review 
Our treatment of the nationwide national government in-
junction and United States constitutional law begins with Mar-
bury v. Madison and judicial review.15 This includes review of 
state and federal statutes and federal executive branch 
measures. 
In Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton maintained that 
acts of Congress “which are not pursuant to its constitutional 
powers” will not “become the supreme law of the land. These will 
 
1 (2019); Zayne Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017); 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Russell L. Weaver, Nationwide Injunctions, 14 F.I.U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Katherine B. Wheeler, Comment, Why There Should 
Be a Presumption Against Nationwide Preliminary Injunctions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 200 
(2017). 
 12. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil 
Litigating Components U.S. Att’ys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the 
Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/press-release/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/B64W-EQHH] [hereinafter 
Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions]. 
 13. 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 66 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 14. See Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide 
Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Frost, supra 
note 9; Suzette Malveaux, Response, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National 
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); see also Clopton, supra note 11; 
Trammell, supra note 9. 
 15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as 
such.”16 
Article III of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court 
possesses the “judicial Power of the United States.”17 In 1803, in 
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall operational-
ized judicial review in the U.S. constitutional system. The Court 
held that “the judicial power” included power to interpret the 
Constitution and decide whether an act of Congress was uncon-
stitutional: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”18 The Court re-
viewed the legality of executive branch action and held that 
courts cannot be bound by a federal statute that is contrary to 
the Constitution.19 “Thus,” Professor Gordon Wood wrote, “the 
source of judicial review lay not in the idea of fundamental law 
or in written constitutions, but in the transformation of this 
written fundamental law into the kind of law that could be ex-
pounded and construed in the ordinary court system.”20 To in-
terpret and implement the Constitution, federal trial and appel-
late courts may need broad injunctions. 
B. Separation of Powers 
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in 
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,” the En-
lightenment philosopher Montesquieu wrote, “there can be no 
liberty.”21 Judicial review implements separation of powers by 
negating Congress’s and the President’s overreaching measures. 
Separation of powers developed slowly and unevenly. After 
Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court did not declare another 
federal statute unconstitutional for over fifty years. In the 1857 
Dred Scott22 decision (one of the Court’s most regressive deci-
sions), the Court declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitu-
 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren ed., 
1973). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 18. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
 19. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 12–21 
(2000); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, at 433–59 (2009). 
 20. WOOD, supra note 19, at 448. 
 21. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Hafner Library of 
Classics ed., 1959) (1748). 
 22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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tional—giving the technique an unsavory and disreputable 
quality. 
In the meantime, President Jackson thought that Supreme 
Court decisions only bound lower courts and that the President 
and Congress could decide constitutional issues in ways that dis-
agreed with the federal courts’ decisions.23 After Worcester v. 
Georgia24 disapproved Cherokee removal in 1832, an angry 
Jackson said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now let 
him enforce it.”25 
C. Judicial Review in Action to Curb Executive Branch 
Excesses 
Distinctions within judicial review are between state and 
federal measures and, within federal measures, between stat-
utes and executive orders. After touching on state measures and 
federal statutes, this Article focuses on federal executive 
measures. 
Earlier constitutional defendants were mostly state and lo-
cal authorities, not the federal government. The courts’ orders 
were limited to voiding the unconstitutional state and local gov-
ernment actions. During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court 
struck down state statutes on substantive due process 
grounds,26 creating another unsavory odor in liberal nostrils. In 
the Civil Rights era, the Court voided state-mandated segrega-
tion and Jim Crow statutes. These controversial decisions led to 
Massive Resistance and jurisdiction-stripping bills.27 One reac-
tion to federal courts striking down state statutes was the three-
judge district court with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.28 
When the federal government is involved, the Supreme 
Court sometimes steps in to void unconstitutional acts of Con-
 
 23. H. W. BRANDS, HEIRS OF THE FOUNDERS: THE EPIC RIVALRY OF HENRY 
CLAY, JOHN CALHOUN, AND DANIEL WEBSTER, THE SECOND GENERATION OF 
AMERICAN GIANTS 306–11 (2018). 
 24.  31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 25. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 412 (2007); see also BREYER, supra 
note 19, at 22–31. 
 26. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND 
IDEAS 291–95, 409–23 (2019). 
 27. Caprice Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three-String 
Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 603 n.31 (2006). 
 28. The remaining three-judge federal district court handles state 
reapportionment. 
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gress. Two representative decisions that struck down federal 
statutes are United States v. Davis and United States v. Lopez. 
In United States v. Davis, the Court struck down the residual 
clause of a federal statute that allowed an enhanced sentence 
when the defendant used, carried, or possessed a firearm while 
committing a crime of violence.29 The statute’s residual clause 
defined a “crime of violence” as a felony “that by its nature, in-
volves a substantial risk that physical force against the person 
or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.”30 The Court struck this clause down as unconstitu-
tionally vague.31 In United States v. Lopez, the Court considered 
the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which criminalized pos-
session of a gun in a school zone.32 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the Act exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.33 
Judicial review has also been used to curb executive actions, 
although historically the President did not possess the amount 
of unilateral authority we see today. Except during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, the President occupied a smaller office than 
today. With characters like Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and 
John Calhoun, Congress debated and shaped legislative discus-
sions about tariffs, western expansion, and slavery. Theodore 
Roosevelt began to transform the presidency into a “bully pul-
pit.” Later Presidents, including Woodrow Wilson and activist 
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, expanded 
the powers of the President and the executive with the New Deal 
and the Great Society. Congress delegated policy initiatives and 
power to the executive and administrative agencies.34 
Divided government exists when the President’s party does 
not control one or both houses of Congress. Coupled with divided 
government, intense partisanship has embittered and clogged 
the legislative process. This leads to unilateral executive detours 
around Congress. For example: 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told the New York 
Times in an interview that he was reviewing whether to move 
 
 29.  139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2018). 
 31. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336. 
 32.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 33. Id.  
 34. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, LEADERSHIP: IN TURBULENT TIMES 280–343 
(2018); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT VOLUME II: THE 
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933–1935, at 1–27 (2003). 
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ahead [with an inflation change that the Justice Department 
had earlier rejected] if Congress doesn’t act on its own.  
 “If it can’t get done through a legislation process, we will 
look at what tools at Treasury we have to do it on our own 
and we’ll consider that,” Mnuchin told the New York 
Times.35 
The Trump Administration, with its fixed views about 
stricter immigration, has abandoned the legislative process. It 
seeks to control immigration through executive branch 
measures.36 New immigration regulations and executive orders 
will lead to more litigation, probably followed by more nation-
wide national government injunctions. 
National government injunctions respond to a paralyzed 
Congress as well as the federal executive’s practice of issuing 
executive orders and administrative regulations to make major 
unilateral policy changes that bypass the legislative process. 
Separation of powers and judicial review together enable courts 
to prevent the executive’s improper and arbitrary exercise of 
power. As Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissenting opinion in 
Myers v. United States: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the 
convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude 
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid 
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to 
the distribution of the governmental powers among three de-
partments, to save the people from autocracy.37 
In 1952, the Supreme Court decided its most important case 
regarding executive branch overreach. In Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer, the Court struck down the President’s executive 
order taking over the steel industry to avert a strike.38 After an 
 
 35. Damian Paletta, Trump Administration Considers Tax Cut for the Wealthy, 
WASH. POST (July 30, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/trump-administration-considers-tax-cut-for-the-wealthy/2018/07/30
/1dbaafbc-9442-11e8-810c-5fa705927d54 [https://perma.cc/8WD5-PQ2V]. 
 36. Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, The Adviser Who Scripts Trump’s Border 
Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/2019/politics/stephen-miller-trump-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/B9B7-EKPN]. 
 37. 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 38. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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accelerated appeal, the Court affirmed the district court’s pre-
liminary injunction overturning the executive order. Treated as 
the Court’s majority opinion in subsequent decisions, Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence rejected inherent executive authority and 
vindicated both Congress’s power to create law and courts’ power 
to analyze its constitutionality: “With all its defects, delays and 
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long pre-
serving free government except that the Executive be under the 
law, and that the law be made by parliamentary delibera-
tions.”39 
Youngstown strengthened the Court’s resolve in future dis-
putes about executive power. For example, in Correctional Ser-
vices Corp. v. Malesko, the Court stated, “[I]njunctive relief ‘has 
long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities 
from acting unconstitutionally.’”40 Before that, in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, the Court said that “[i]t is settled law that the 
separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of ju-
risdiction over the President of the United States.”41 “[W]e have 
long held,” the Court said in Clinton v. Jones, “that when the 
President takes official action, the Court has the authority to de-
termine whether he has acted within the law.”42 “[T]he 
Executive is bound to comply with the rule of law,” the Court 
concluded in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.43 
Federal courts use national government injunctions as rem-
edies to stop improper measures from the two political branches 
and to protect citizens’ constitutional and other substantive 
rights. A nationwide national government injunction may be the 
only way to extend complete relief to plaintiffs, protect their en-
titlements, and to avoid illegal or unconstitutional government 
policies that harm thousands of others. An independent federal 
judiciary needs to be able to grant a national government injunc-
tion when appropriate to curb an improper executive initiative. 
A nationwide national government injunction leads to national 
 
 39. Id. at 655. For background and context, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: 
THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010) 
and MELVIN UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE 
COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 251–56 (2015). 
 40. 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). 
 41. 457 U.S. 731, 753–54 (1982). 
 42. 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); see also Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225–
26 (2011); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
491 n.2 (2010) (discussing injunctions to protect constitutional rights). 
 43. 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). 
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uniformity. Sometimes, anything short of a nationwide injunc-
tion is impossible to administer and treats similarly situated 
victims unequally.44 
Why do federal courts need effective national government 
injunctions as remedies to stop improper executive initiatives? 
The long-term answer is complete relief for successful plaintiffs, 
suppression of lawbreaking, separation of powers, the im-
portance of the courts’ role in enforcing the Constitution, judicial 
independence, and judicial review. Developments include the ex-
pansion of presidential power, the desiccation of congressional 
power, extreme partisanship in Congress, and the federal gov-
ernment’s division between political parties.45 The short, 
contemporary answer, which will be developed below, is the peril 
the Trump presidency poses to democratic values. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit responded to 
the government’s argument against a national government in-
junction by emphasizing the role of the trial judge (the initial 
decision-maker): 
Although the pursuit of nationwide injunctions may be influ-
enced by shifting political motivations, that neither means 
that nationwide injunctions themselves are inherently evil, 
nor that such injunctions should never be issued. Instead, 
courts in determining the proper scope of injunctive relief, 
must be cognizant of the potential for such injunctions to 
have a profound impact on national policy.46 
The legal subject of the national government injunction was 
essentially unstudied until 2015. Professional interest began 
when conservative state attorneys general sued to void Obama-
era executive branch initiatives. These plaintiffs filed their law-
suits in carefully selected Texas judicial districts where 
 
 44. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1789 (1991) (observing that 
constitutional remedies provide relief to victims and avoid governmental breaches 
of the law, the latter of which is, “if not the more fundamental, at least the more 
unyielding”). 
 45. KEVIN M. KRUSE & JULIAN E ZELIZER, FAULT LINES: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES SINCE 1974, at 170–71, 202, 296, 301–02, 310–11, 313, 350–52, 
357–58 (2019). 
 46. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated 
in part, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 
2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018), stay denied, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 
1963679 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018). 
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“friendly” conservative judges were predisposed to oppose 
Obama’s measures. Several of the handpicked judges agreed and 
granted injunctions against the Administration that forbade it 
from implementing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA), guidelines for treatment of transgender individuals, 
and minimum wage thresholds anywhere in the United States.47 
Hence, these national government injunctions had nationwide 
effect. 
After Trump became President, the national government in-
junction initiative shifted from conservative to liberal. Plaintiffs, 
state attorneys general, often alongside membership organiza-
tions such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the South-
ern Poverty Law Center, sued to void Trump Administration 
measures and initiatives. The remedies in these lawsuits in-
cluded injunctions against the Muslim ban, family separation, 
and withholding federal funds from sanctuary cities.48 
Litigants’ views of national government injunctions usually 
depend on their views of the substantive merits in the lawsuit 
and whether they are a winning plaintiff or a losing defendant. 
Because politicians are on both winning and losing sides of law-
suits, the national government injunction is bipartisan. Justice 
Thomas and former Attorney General Jeff Sessions had previ-
ously favored (or not disfavored) national government injunc-
 
 47. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670 (N.D. Tex. 2016) 
(granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of a regulation enacted pursuant to 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 
F. Supp. 3d 520, 533–34 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary 
injunction of a minimum wage regulation); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 
810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of federal 
guidelines allowing individuals to use restrooms, showers, and locker rooms based 
on their gender identity as opposed to their biological sex); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 
2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Persuader Advice Exemption Rule); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 
591, 606, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (issuing 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)). 
 48. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 632–33 (D. Md. 
2017), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Hawaii v. 
Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); 
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
3, 2017). 
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tions—yet later they opposed them.49 When Obama was Presi-
dent and Republicans sued to strike down his policies, 
Democratic state attorneys general opposed nationwide national 
government injunctions; now that Trump is President and Dem-
ocratic attorneys general are suing to strike down his policies, 
they argue for nationwide national government injunctions. If 
the 2020 election puts a Democrat in the White House and Dem-
ocratic majorities in the House and Senate, we can expect 
Republican attorneys general to once again favor the national 
government injunction. 
II. PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES FOR A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
INJUNCTION 
This Part traces a hypothetical plaintiff’s federal lawsuit 
that challenges an executive branch defendant’s policy, execu-
tive order, regulation, activity, or practice as violating the 
Constitution or a federal statute. 
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the executive branch 
defendant broke a substantive law. It ends with a demand for a 
remedy to stop the allegedly unlawful activity. The judge finds 
for the plaintiff on liability, holding that the government activity 
is illegal. The executive branch of the government is a law-
breaker basing its illegal activity on a violation of the 
Constitution or a statute. After the executive branch defendant 
loses on the substantive merits, it opposes the plaintiff’s remedy. 
The judge has four possible remedies. First, a declaratory 
judgment that tells the parties what the law says about their 
dispute. If the defendants ignore a declaratory judgment, the 
judge cannot hold them in contempt.50 The judge’s second possi-
ble remedy is this Article’s focus: an injunction. An injunction is 
an in personam order that forbids a defendant’s defined miscon-
duct or orders defined conduct. This Article focuses more on the 
“forbid,” or prohibitory injunction, than the mandatory injunc-
tion. The judge’s remedy is to grant the successful plaintiff a 
 
 49. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 288 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Linda 
Greenhouse, Is Clarence Thomas the Supreme Court’s Future?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/contributors/clarence-thomas-
supreme-court-conservative.html [https://perma.cc/C62L-MZ6X]. 
 50. Doug Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78 
W. VA. L. REV. 155, 162 (1976). 
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national government injunction that forbids the executive 
branch defendant’s illegal activity. 
The national government injunction’s critics pass over the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit and the judge’s merits decision for the plaintiff 
against the executive branch defendant. The critics enter only at 
the remedies stage, when the court grants an injunction against 
the executive’s illegal conduct. The critics argue against the 
shape and breadth of the judge’s national government 
injunction. 
The third and fourth possible remedies are closely related to 
the national government injunction: the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) remedies of vacatur51 and statutory 
mandamus.52 Under the APA’s remedy section, a reviewing 
court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”53 
Vacatur, which means setting aside, may affect people who are 
not plaintiffs: 
In some cases, the “agency action” will consist of a rule of 
broad applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is 
that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids 
its application to a particular individual. Under these circum-
stances a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the rule, 
may obtain “programmatic” relief that affects the rights of 
parties not before the court.54 
Although a reviewing court will usually vacate an illegal meas-
ure, it has discretion to remand without vacatur.55 
Courts have not established the relationship between vaca-
tur and a national government injunction. In Regents of the 
 
 51. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see also Amdur & Hausman, supra note 14; 
Frost, supra note 9. 
 52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018) (noting that mandamus empowers federal 
courts to compel certain government officials and agencies “to perform a duty owed 
to the plaintiff”). 
 53. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Mereck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
385 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2019) (vacating rule in excess of statutory authority). 
 54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 
511 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)), granting cert., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). 
 55. Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d 66, 92–
93 (D.D.C. 2019); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and 
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003). 
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University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, the court of appeals gave nationwide relief under vacatur 
as a reason to approve a nationwide injunction.56 In O.A. v. 
Trump, plaintiffs sought a national government injunction.57 
The government argued that an injunction should benefit only 
individual plaintiffs. The judge granted vacatur but no injunc-
tion; however, he refused to vacate only in favor of plaintiffs. He 
determined that the whole government must obey.58 On the 
other hand, in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (a case 
about Trump’s limitation of asylum on the Mexican border) the 
judge granted a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) 
based on the APA section that provided for vacatur.59 
Like a declaratory judgment, vacatur will not support con-
tempt if the defendant violates it. If the defendant obeys, which 
the federal government does, then vacatur extirpates the agency 
action and has the same practical effect as a national govern-
ment injunction. Courts favoring vacatur over an injunction 
have emphasized that an injunction is “extraordinary.”60 
Mandamus under the federal statute allows a federal judge 
to compel a government agency or official “to perform a duty 
owed to the plaintiff.”61 Some plaintiffs have sought statutory 
mandamus.62 Mandamus under statute is a narrow and tech-
nical remedy: “Mandamus relief is appropriate only where ‘(1) 
the plaintiffs have a right to have the act performed, (2) the de-
fendant is under a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform the 
act requested, and (3) plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues 
 
 56. 908 F.3d at 511. 
 57.  404 F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2019). 
 58. Id. at 116–17. 
 59. 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 866–67 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Council of Parent Att’ys & 
Advocates, Inc. v. DeVos, 365 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 
19-5137, 2019 WL 4565514 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2019) (vacating where plaintiffs also 
sought an injunction). 
 60. O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 116–18. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018). Mandamus is also an extraordinary writ used to 
seek an interlocutory appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 21. That will be examined below. 
Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolishes mandamus, along with 
scire facias. Mandamus’s funeral was premature. Congress passed § 1361 in 1962. 
Action to Compel an Officer of the United States to Perform His Duty, Pub. L. No. 
87-748, 76 Stat. 744; see 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3134 (3d ed. 2019). Mandamus survived. The Supreme 
Court’s treatment of mandamus shows its confusion in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates 
that mandamus is an equitable, not a legal, remedy. 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 62. M.M.M. ex rel. J.M.A. v. Sessions, 319 F. Supp. 3d 290 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(approving 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer where family separation plaintiffs sought 
mandamus). 
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of relief.’”63 In sanctuary city lawsuits, courts have granted man-
damus where they have also granted injunctions, but stayed or 
denied nationwide injunctive relief.64 
An injunction is the plaintiff’s superior remedy because it 
will support contempt if the defendant violates it. Plaintiffs 
should also consider seeking a declaratory judgment, APA vaca-
tur, and statutory mandamus as alternative remedies or in ad-
dition to a national government injunction. 
The judge’s injunction will have two principal parts: The 
first part details the improper conduct and forbids it. The second 
part defines those required to obey the injunction. This Article 
de-emphasizes the first part to discuss the second part of the in-
junction in greater detail. The federal government is an entity 
created by law that acts through agents. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(d)(2) contains the limiting principle: it adjures obe-
dience to an injunction only by the defendant, the defendant’s 
agents, and others “in active concert or participation.”65 This Ar-
ticle focuses on the requirement that a named defendant’s 
agents must obey an injunction against their supervisor. The 
second part of a national government injunction will order the 
named executive branch defendant and his agents to obey. 
Agents must obey an injunction against their principal because 
they do the principal’s bidding, and the principal will represent 
their interest along with his own.66 The government’s vigorous 
and skillful defense in national government injunction lawsuits 
assures that the named defendant’s subordinates in the federal 
bureaucracy are ably and well represented. The national govern-
ment injunction’s critics pass over the requirement that the ex-
ecutive branch defendant’s subordinate agents are obliged by 
the federal rule to obey. 
The named defendant’s successor in office inherits the in-
junction along with the job.67 Although an “agent,” the named 
executive branch defendant is, in effect, more of an office than a 
 
 63. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(quoting City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 739 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
 64. City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 372 F. Supp. 3d 928, 953–54 
(N.D. Cal. 2019); County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018), judgment entered sub nom. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, No. 
3:17-CV-04701-WHO, 2018 WL 6069940 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018); New York v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 242–43. 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to 
Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1975). 
 66. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 894. 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). 
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person. Courts that have issued national government injunc-
tions have applied the principle of in personam jurisdiction.68 “A 
district court, pursuant to its powers in equity, ‘may command 
persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its 
territorial jurisdiction.’”69 Generally, under the basic equitable 
principle of in personam jurisdiction, an injunction orders the 
defendant and its agents to obey wherever they are. The injunc-
tion operates worldwide if necessary. A judge with equity power 
in a lawsuit with personal jurisdiction over the defendant may 
order or forbid the defendant’s improper conduct everywhere.70 
The defendant’s agents must comply with an injunction eve-
rywhere those agents are. The federal government is ubiquitous 
in the United States. Because the government is everywhere, the 
injunction is also ubiquitous. The national government injunc-
tion’s critics detour around the requirement of obedience and 
emphasize one of the injunction’s effects: they argue, among 
other things, that an injunction should not “benefit” people who 
are not parties to the lawsuit.71 This Article emphasizes who 
must obey an injunction more than how an injunction affects 
nonparties. 
Most people comply with court decisions because it is the 
right thing to do. If a judge grants a plaintiff an injunction, the 
defendant’s agents have a duty to obey because the injunction 
applies to the defendant plus its agents, and it is the apparent 
law. 
If a judge grants a plaintiff an injunction that forbids or 
commands the defendant’s conduct, it requires the defendant to 
obey everywhere. A national business must be ordered to obey 
nationwide. Consider a patent infringement injunction against 
a national retail chain; the injunction bans the defendant and its 
agent-employees from continuing to infringe upon sales any-
where. Statutes facilitate the plaintiff’s contempt enforcement of 
 
 68. City & County of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Becerra, 2018 WL 
6069940. 
 69. City & County of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) (citing United States v. Oregon, 657 
F.2d 1009, 1016 n.17 (9th Cir. 1981) (“When a district court has jurisdiction over 
all parties involved, it may enjoin commission of acts outside of its district.”))). 
 70. See Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810); Koehler v. Bank of 
Berm. Ltd., 101 F.3d 863 (2d Cir. 1996); Michael Douglas, Extraterritorial 
Injunctions Affecting the Internet, 12 J. EQUITY 34, 35 n.5 (2018). 
 71. See Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12; Bray, 
supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; Wasserman, 
supra note 10, at 356. 
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trademark and copyright injunctions in other federal courts.72 
The forum court may punish a defendant’s violation of an injunc-
tion in another jurisdiction as forum contempt.73 
Under rule of law and traditional equitable principles, the 
defendant who is an executive branch official also should obey 
the judge’s injunction. Why might the government ask for differ-
ent treatment? 
III. TRUMP CHALLENGES JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
The national government injunction is one important tool 
among several to reduce the damage the Trump Administration 
has inflicted and is likely to continue to inflict. “Experience over 
the last two years,” Professor Steve Burbank write, “has re-
minded us that, in times of aspiring authoritarianism in the ex-
ecutive branch and serial subservience in the legislative branch, 
independent and accountable courts are the bulwark of our free-
doms.”74 “This nation,” the Supreme Court wrote in Ex parte 
Milligan, “has no right to expect that it will always have wise 
and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the 
Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of 
liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by 
Washington and Lincoln.”75 
Trump challenges the basic principles of separation of pow-
ers and judicial review: Trump once remarked, “I have an Article 
II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.”76 
The desiccation of Congress at the expense of the President 
set the stage for President Trump’s executive activity. Trump is 
taking advantage of past Congresses’ excessive delegations of 
power to the executive branch to implement his autocratic and 
authoritarian views. His measures threaten democratic institu-
 
 72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), (b) (2018); 17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2018). 
 73. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 237 (1998). 
 74. Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five 
Years in the Trenches and in the Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 34 (2019). 
 75. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). 
 76. Michael Brice-Saddler, While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely 
Says the Constitution Gives Him ‘the Right to Do Whatever I Want’, WASH. POST 
(July 23, 2019, 7:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23
/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-
whatever-i-want/ [https://perma.cc/KSZ6-EXNH]. 
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tions. The Republican party has been unwilling to challenge 
Trump’s measures. History provides no guidance.77 
Trump’s executive orders challenge the rule of law: the prin-
ciple that “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is sub-
ject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the juris-
diction of the ordinary tribunals” and is responsible for “every 
act done without legal justification.”78 Professor Driesen exam-
ined the executive orders and concluded that Trump’s “collection 
of decrees poses an unprecedented challenge to our constitu-
tional democracy as a system.”79 Judge Gertner wrote, “[A]ll of 
this may look different with new Trump appointees emboldened 
. . . on an explicit mission to transform the decisional law. Their 
goal may be to change the prevailing assumptions of the past 
thirty years—about civil rights, the rights of criminal defend-
ants, checks and balances, etc.”80 
For example, the Trump Administration’s immigration pol-
icy of “zero-tolerance,” its separation of children from their par-
ents, and its begrudging obedience to court orders to reunite the 
families are unique in their overreach and long-term harm to the 
children.81 The Trump Administration’s contempt for and disre-
gard of separation of powers and the rule of law differs in kind 
from the preceding administration’s approach. The Obama and 
Trump Administrations should not be equated.82 
 
 77. Katie Shepherd, Trump ‘Violates All Recognized Democratic Norms,’ 
Federal Judge Says in Biting Speech on Judicial Independence, WASH. POST (Nov. 
8, 2019, 4:41 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/08/judge-says-
trump-violates-democratic-norms-judiciary-speech/ [https://perma.cc/B9SF-
MRVC]. 
 78. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 189 (6th ed. 1902). 
 79. David M. Driesen, President Trump’s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law, 
87 UMKC L. REV. 489, 490 (2019). 
 80. Nancy Gertner, The “Lower” Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump, 
93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ONLINE 7, 13 (2018). 
 81. Maria Sacchetti, ACLU Says 1,500 More Migrant Children Were Taken 
from Parents By the Trump Administration, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 7:28 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/aclu-says-1500-more-migrant-
children-were-taken-from-parents-by-trump-administration/2019/10/24/d014f818-
f6aa-11e9-a285-882a8e386a96 [https://perma.cc/MM4R-B9MH]; Maria Sacchetti, 
ACLU: U.S. Has Taken Nearly 1,000 Child Migrants from Their Parents Since 




 82. See Driesen, supra note 79, at 518–24. 
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Federal judges have ruled against the Trump administration 
at least 63 times over the past two years, an extraordinary 
record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the pres-
ident’s agenda on the environment, immigration and other 
matters. . . .  
. . . . 
. . .[T]he rulings so far paint a remarkable portrait of a gov-
ernment rushing to implement far-reaching changes in policy 
without regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and 
capricious behavior.83 
Trump is the President our forefathers warned us against.84 
Madison and Hamilton feared concentrated power. As the Sev-
enth Circuit noted in City of Chicago v. Sessions:  
 The founders of our country well understood that the con-
centration of power threatens individual liberty and estab-
lished a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a 
separation of powers among the branches of government. If 
the Executive Branch can determine policy, and then use the 
power of the purse to mandate compliance with that policy by 
the state and local governments, all without the authoriza-
tion or even acquiescence of elected legislators, the check 
against tyranny is forsaken.85  
 
 83. Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration 
Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-
trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-
b51b7ff322e9 [https://perma.cc/MCY5-SLBE]; see also Fred Barbash, Trump’s 
Immigration Policies Fail Time and Again When Faced with Scrutiny from the 
Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-immigration-policies-
fail-time-and-again-when-faced-with-scrutiny-from-the-federal-courts/2019/04/11
/e2bfcc5a-5bb3-11e9-9625-01d48d50ef75 [https://perma.cc/L83B-22QX] (reporting 
twenty-five Trump losses in immigration cases). 
 84. Ron Chernow, Hamilton Pushed for Impeachment Powers. Trump Is What 
He Had in Mind, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2019/10/18/hamilton-pushed-impeachment-powers-trump-is-what-he-
had-mind/ [https://perma.cc/X8FL-Q9NC]. 
 85. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018), stay denied, 
2018 WL 1963679 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion 
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Former federal District Judge Nancy Gertner concluded that the 
“challenges to checks and balances, to the separation of powers, 
even to elementary notions of federalism, are not abstract but 
concrete; not aberrant but systemic.”86 
Trump’s excesses are not the reason for the national govern-
ment injunction, but they illustrate why courts need the national 
government injunction as an available judicial remedy. Trump’s 
disregard for the integrity of democratic institutions, norms, 
processes, and rules threatens our constitutional order and the 
rule of law. His authoritarian, unilateralist approach to govern-
ment threatens government by decree. His impulsive disrespect 
for the traditional limits on his office has opened a new frontier 
in executive overreach.87 Will the constitutional system of sepa-
ration of powers, an independent judiciary, federalism, and free-
dom of speech provide accountability?88 
In 2019, Trump’s complete opposition to congressional over-
sight subpoenas opened a new chapter in the question of contin-
uing obedience to court orders.89 Trump’s refusal to cooperate 
with the House of Representatives’ inquiry seeking testimony 
and documents as part of the impeachment process raised ques-
tions about the executive branch’s willingness to obey court or-
ders and injunctions. In response to one refusal, Judge Ketanji 
Brown Jackson wrote: 
[B]latant defiance of Congress’ centuries-old power to compel 
the performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor is 
it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an affront to the 
mechanism for curbing abuses of power that the Framers 
carefully crafted for our protection, and, thereby, recalcitrant 
 
vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, 
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018). 
 86. Gertner, supra note 80, at 85. 
 87. Shepherd, supra note 77.  
 88. See Gertner, supra note 80 (outlining no appreciation of constitutional 
checks and balances, no sense of the limits of his own authority). 
 89. See Jennifer Rubin, If the Administration Defied a Court Order, All Bets 
Are Off, WASH. POST (June 2, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/2019/06/02/if-administration-defied-court-order-all-bets-are-off/ [https://
perma.cc/T6A3-WJP6]; Steve Vladeck, Trump Isn’t Just Defying Congress. He’s 
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witnesses actually undermine the broader interests of the 
People of the United States.90 
If it occurs, disobedience will undermine the integrity of the law 
and the public’s respect for it.91 
Does the executive branch accept a powerful and independ-
ent judiciary? The Trump Administration has thus far complied 
with every national government injunction against it.92 Profes-
sor Parrillo is less optimistic about obedience. Parrillo wrote that 
contempt’s shaming power 
 depends on how deeply and exclusively the defendant official 
is committed to the group(s) that hold dear the norm.  
. . . . 
. . . Rising partisan polarization could, ultimately, diminish 
the shaming power of contempt findings if people affiliated 
with a political party come to dismiss any contempt finding 
that goes against officials of their party.93  
Whether that prediction describes the present state of the 
Trump Administration’s recalcitrance and polarization remains 
to be seen. 
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions did not realize he was 
supporting this Article’s concern about Trump’s improper activ-
ity when he said of national government injunctions that “[t]his 
kind of judicial activism did not happen a single time in our first 
175 years as a nation, but it has become common in recent years. 
 
 90. Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 415 F. 
Supp. 3d 148, 191 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Comm. on 
Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL 
1228477 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2020) 
 91. Steve Vladeck, What Would Happen if Trump Ignored a Divided Supreme 




 92. Tara Leigh Grove, Foreword: Some Puzzles of State Standing, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1883 (2019). 
 93. Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental 
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 791–93 
(2018). 
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It has happened to the Trump administration 25 times in less 
than two years.”94 This Article was written in 2018 and 2019 in 
the hope that, after the 2020 election, much of it will have be-
come obsolete because the United States will have returned to a 
“normal” level of executive lawbreaking, with the federal court’s 
injunction remedy intact.95 
This Article’s central idea is that Trump’s threat to the Con-
stitution and basic liberties needs to be curbed. The nationwide 
national government injunction is one part of that effort. As 
King Henry cried in Shakespeare’s Henry V: “Once more unto 
the breach, dear friends, once more.”96  
IV. REPLY TO CRITICS OF THE NATIONWIDE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION 
What do critics think is improper about a national govern-
ment injunction? Critics of national government injunctions ar-
ticulate several reasons to oppose them: The federal court lacks 
authority, power, or jurisdiction to grant a national government 
injunction. National government injunctions encourage forum 
shopping. They create a risk of conflicting injunctions. They po-
liticize the judiciary. 
National government injunctions, critics also argue, erode 
the percolation of issues in the federal courts. They distort the 
usual operation of precedent. An argument that critics empha-
 
 94. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Releases 
Memorandum on Litigation Guidelines for Nationwide Injunctions Cases (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-releases-memoran 
dum-litigation-guidelines-nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/XJM4-EDWM]. 
 95. Another indirect confirmation of the Trump Administration’s differences in 
kind comes from observing big-firm lawyers. Republicans have found it difficult to 
find and pay lawyers to challenge measures from the Obama Administration; the 
lawyers discovered that the work was unpopular in their firms. But skilled lawyers 
who are excited to oppose Trump Administration measures are working pro bono, 
without fees. “There’s a whole range of stuff that Republican administrations 
engage in all the time, and you don’t see the law firms challenging it,” former Acting 
Solicitor General and current Hogan Lovells partner Neal Katyal said. “But what’s 
going on here, like the census case, is so beyond the pale. That’s why you’re seeing 
lawyers stand up and do this.” Jacqueline Thomsen, Big Law Billed Republicans 
Millions to Sue Obama. Against Trump, Firms Are Working for Free, LAW.COM 
(Aug. 22, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/08/22/big-
law-billed-republicans-millions-to-sue-obama-against-trump-firms-are-working-
for-free/ [https://perma.cc/F95F-3FHY] (explaining that House Republicans 
struggled to find lawyers willing to work on their challenges to the Obama 
Administration due to the unpopularity of the stances). 
 96.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3, sc. 1. 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:12 PM 
912 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
size is that national government injunctions benefit nonparties. 
Critics also maintain that a national government injunction cre-
ates asymmetry. Finally, critics’ best argument is that a 
national government injunction allows a single trial judge to 
stop the whole federal executive branch of the United States gov-
ernment. 
This Article disagrees with the national government injunc-
tion’s critics. It favors a judge’s ability to grant a nationwide na-
tional government injunction. Its position is that a federal dis-
trict judge has jurisdiction and authority to grant an injunction 
that bars the federal executive from implementing an unconsti-
tutional or illegal federal government program anywhere in the 
United States. 
This Article responds to the critics’ arguments. It maintains 
that their arguments are unconvincing, incorrect, overstated, or 
only true some of the time. It rephrases the critics’ final argu-
ment as contesting the role of a federal court in halting illegal 
federal executive overreach. It concludes that if the federal 
courts develop, apply, and mold important procedural and equi-
table filters and principles of confinement, a federal court may 
grant a plaintiff a nationwide national government injunction 
against an executive branch defendant’s improper activity. 
Critics’ opposition to national government injunctions re-
sembles arguments for tort reform. In this context, large-scale 
tortfeasors, who are unlikely underdogs, take their arguments 
to appellate courts and legislatures. They posit mistrust for the 
judges and juries who made the initial decisions, and they op-
pose what they view as excessive remedies. Similarly, in 
opposing a national government injunction, executive branch de-
fendants, who have already lost on the merits, seek to 
circumscribe the winner’s remedy. The national government in-
junction’s opponents have sought relief in both legislatures and 
courts. A damages cap is a typical tort reform goal.97 Opponents 
here similarly seek to “cap” or reduce the size or breadth of the 
injunction that the trial judge may grant. 
Injunction reform has taken legislative form. This Article 
will mention only the high points of earlier legislative injunction 
reform. The granddaddy is the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which 
 
 97. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); BMW of N. Am., Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, https://www.atra.org 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BUK2-8LG4]. 
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curbs a federal court’s ability to enjoin a strike.98 The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act99 also legislated another injunction 
reform against structural condition injunctions in prisons.  
Grandstanding members of Congress have introduced “ju-
risdiction-stripping” bills and constitutional amendments, for 
example, to end federal judges’ busing injunctions to desegregate 
schools.100 Legislative injunction reform bills have been intro-
duced in both the 115th and 116th Congresses to forbid nonparty 
national government injunctions (except in class actions) and to 
limit attacks on federal measures to the District of Columbia dis-
trict courts.101 
Before the 2018 election, when the Republicans controlled 
the House of Representatives, a House subcommittee held a 
hearing on legislation that would limit national government in-
junctions to the District of Columbia federal courts.102 Following 
the 2018 election, the new Democratic majority in the House 
seems unlikely to renew interest in legislation that reduces fed-
eral courts’ ability to curb illegal Trump Administration 
measures. All of the bills’ sponsors have been Republicans. Alt-
hough my calls to committee staff lawyers were not returned, a 
likely conclusion is that the House bills are dead on arrival in 
the Democratic House, and if the Senate takes any action on the 
Senate bills, they are dead on arrival in the House. 
 
 98. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110 (2018). 
 99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2018). 
 100. Roberts, supra note 27, at 628 n.146. 
 101. Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act of 2019, S. 2464, 116th Cong. 
(2019); Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 4292, 116th 
Cong. (2019); Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2019, H.R. 77, 116th Cong. 
(2019); Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Assigning Proper Placement of Executive Action Lawsuits Act (APPEAL 
Act), H.R. 2660, 115th Cong (2017). 
 102. The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 30, 2017); H.R. 2660; see also H.R. 6730, 115th 
Cong. (2018) (directing that no federal court may issue “an order that purports to 
restrain the enforcement against a non-party of any statute, regulation, order, or 
similar authority”). In February 2020, a Senate committee held a hearing on one of 
the injunction reform bills. The senators appeared to conclude that the courts 
should decide how to handle nationwide injunctions. Jacqueline Thomsen, 
Lawmakers, Stuck in Political Deadlock, Look to Supreme Court to Fix National 
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One of this Article’s goals is to show that neither judicial nor 
legislative injunction reform of nationwide national government 
injunctions is needed. 
A. The Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Authority 
This Article will next discuss the federal courts’ authority 
under the technical subject of jurisdiction. This lengthy treat-
ment establishes the federal courts’ authority and jurisdiction 
and articulates the federal courts’ posture toward the national 
government injunction. 
Critics question the federal courts’ ability, authority, or ju-
risdiction to grant a national government injunction.103 The con-
stitutional argument against nationwide injunctions is difficult 
to figure out. The argument that federal judges lack the author-
ity or jurisdiction to grant national government injunctions is 
both underdeveloped and understated. Justice Thomas and 
other critics seem to assert that the nationwide injunction is not 
included in the federal courts’ Article III “judicial Power” or “Eq-
uity” power.104 They appear to base this assertion on the 
argument that the nationwide injunction only recently emerged 
as a remedy. Justice Thomas seeks to limit the courts’ remedial 
power and to return the federal courts’ remedial power to an im-
agined past. Careful scholarship has uncovered nonparty 
injunctions and precursors of the nationwide injunction far ear-
lier than critics assert. The federal courts’ Article III power to 
decide cases in “Equity” extends jurisdiction to all levels of the 
United States courts to grant an injunction. Jurisdiction in eq-
uity includes jurisdiction to grant a plaintiff a broad injunction 
as relief for a defendant’s wrong. The constitutional argument 
against the national government injunction fails.105 
This Article will develop the federal courts’ authority106 and 
jurisdiction.107 This discussion is based on traditional equitable 
 
 103. See Bray, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; Wasserman, supra 
note 10. 
 104. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 105. See Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and 
Appellee the City of Chicago at 26–28, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, No. 18-2885 
(7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018); Trammell, supra note 9; Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of 
the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020); James E. Pfander & Jacob 
Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4 n.13). 
 106. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 107. See Bray, supra note 11; Wasserman, supra note 10. 
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analysis of subject matter jurisdiction and equitable jurisdiction. 
It is based on and follows the late Harvard Professor Zechariah 
Chafee’s 1950 analysis in Some Problems of Equity.108 It distin-
guishes the two. It identifies the courts’ subject matter jurisdic-
tion to grant a nationwide national government injunction. It 
classifies decisions about a national government injunction un-
der equity jurisdiction, and it analyzes the consequences of that 
classification. 
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A court’s jurisdiction falls under two major headings. First 
is its personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Article’s dis-
cussion of the national government injunction takes the federal 
courts’ personal jurisdiction over the defendant for granted. Sec-
ond, is our topic: subject matter jurisdiction. 
A court has subject matter jurisdiction when the Constitu-
tion or statute says that this court can decide this kind of dis-
pute.109 An opponent of a judgment has an incentive to charac-
terize it as based on a lack of jurisdiction and void, rather than 
erroneous. The opponent seeks to obtain the benefit of lack of 
jurisdiction: voidness instead of error. 
A court’s decision that subject matter jurisdiction is absent 
differs from its conclusion that an earlier decision is substan-
tively incorrect. A decision by a court without subject matter ju-
risdiction is void; it is vulnerable to collateral attack in a later 
lawsuit. A void judgment is not entitled to preclusive res judi-
cata effect or to full faith and credit. There are no time limits on 
collateral attack. One benefit is that a timing rule that defines 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, or sua 
sponte by the judge, because the proceeding is void. On the other 
hand, if a filing requirement is not jurisdictional, the defendant 
must raise it in a timely manner or else it will be waived.110 A 
second benefit for the defendant is that a void injunction will not 
support criminal contempt but, because of the collateral bar rule, 
an incorrect injunction will.111 
A decision by a court with subject matter jurisdiction that is 
substantively incorrect is erroneous. It is entitled to preclusive 
 
 108. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 302 (1950). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Fort Bend County. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019). 
 111. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967). 
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res judicata effect or to full faith and credit in a collateral attack. 
An opponent’s direct attack must occur within time limits. A 
substantively incorrect injunction will support the defendant’s 
criminal contempt. 
For a court of general jurisdiction, the test for subject matter 
jurisdiction is straightforward: do the Constitution and statutes 
give this court the power to decide this kind of lawsuit?112 Fed-
eral courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is more complex because 
federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with two 
principal heads: diversity of citizenship and litigation “arising 
under” the federal Constitution or laws.113 This Article 
discusses the second form of federal jurisdiction. The federal 
question lawsuits we are studying “arise under” because the 
plaintiffs sue federal executive branch defendants who, plain-
tiffs allege, are violating the federal Constitution, statutes, or 
policy. 
Article III grants the federal courts subject matter jurisdic-
tion over “all Cases, in Law and Equity.”114 This grant includes 
the federal courts’ power to issue the equitable remedy of an in-
junction.115 This Article analyzes the type of injunction the 
federal court may grant. 
A court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the 
merits of the lawsuit.116 A decision of a court without subject 
matter jurisdiction is void without referring to whether the de-
cision is “correct” under substantive law.117 “The test of jurisdic-
tion is not [the court’s] right decision, but the [court’s] right to 
enter upon the inquiry and make some decision.”118 
Professor Chafee supported his points about a court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction with two policies. First is the “bright 
line” policy: “The boundary between judicial power and nullity 
should . . . if possible, be a bright line, so that very little thought 
is required to enable judges to keep inside it.”119 A judge should 
be able to decide on subject matter jurisdiction—whether this 
 
 112. See CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 302 (“If th[e] requisites are satisfied, . . . we 
can say that a federal district court almost always has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter.”). 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 115. The Judiciary Act of 1789 section 11 was not carried into the 1948 revision. 
 116. See CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 297. 
 117. See id. at 308. 
 118. Id. (quoting United States v. Ness, 230 F. 950, 953 (8th Cir. 1916), rev’d, 
245 U.S. 319 (1917)). 
 119. Id. at 312. 
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lawsuit belongs in this court—by applying a “bright line” or sim-
ple, straightforward rule about the court. Neither the merits of 
the litigation nor the relief the plaintiff seeks are relevant to 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Second, is the “first things first” policy: “Most well-recog-
nized limitations on judicial power are of such a nature that a 
trial court can dispose of them rapidly in a preliminary proceed-
ing before going into the merits at all.”120 The judge should de-
cide on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the 
more complex decision on the lawsuit’s substantive merits and 
remedy. In brief, a court should decide lack of jurisdiction at the 
outset of a lawsuit by applying straightforward rules. An exam-
ple that first-year civil procedure students study is the require-
ment that a defendant must raise lack of personal jurisdiction 
right away, at peril of waiving it.121 
In addition to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a judge 
must heed the principles of correct substantive and remedial de-
cision-making. A judge’s decision that is contrary to these prin-
ciples is wrong. The judgment is erroneous; an appellate court 
ought to reverse it. But the judgment is valid and entitled to both 
preclusion and full faith and credit.122 
Courts may confuse questions of power or jurisdiction with 
those of judgment or discretion. Courts have struggled with the 
distinction between mistaken-but-valid injunctions and void 
ones. Violations of defective and objectionable injunctions tempt 
appellate courts to find that the injunction is void to avoid the 
criminal contempt that the collateral bar rule inevitably pro-
duces. “Where concepts like ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ are held 
out as placing limitations on a court’s authority to decide, the 
issue may be better understood in terms of the well-developed 
principles concerning the exercise of jurisdiction.”123 
The present Supreme Court appears to favor tight defini-
tions of subject matter jurisdiction as it relates to timing and 
deadlines. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the 
Court defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the courts’ statu-
 
 120. Id. at 317. 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)–(h). A federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction is too 
important to be waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
 122. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–37 (1908); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 30 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 123. Douglas, supra note 70, at 41–42, 45 (emphasis omitted). 
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tory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”124 The 
Court’s decision examined filing requirements that defendants 
have characterized as jurisdictional to avoid deadlines. In 2019, 
the Court said that it needed “[t]o ward off profligate use of the 
term” jurisdiction.125 In 2010, the Court criticized promiscuous 
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”126 Jurisdiction, the Court said, 
refers to “a court’s adjudicatory authority” and is correctly ap-
plied only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases” (sub-
ject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) 
implicating that authority.127 In Fort Bend County v. Davis in 
2019, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a claim-
filing requirement was jurisdictional. The defendant must 
timely raise the non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule or for-
feit it.128 
The Court’s tight definitions of subject matter jurisdiction 
appear to implement Chafee’s “bright line” and “first things 
first” policies. In Stern v. Marshall, it said that “[b]ecause 
‘[b]randing a rule as going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
alters the normal operation of our adversarial system,’ [we are 
not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar] 
when they are not framed as such.”129 “[T]raditional tools of 
statutory construction,” the Court said in 2015 in United States 
v. Kwai Fun Wong, “must plainly show that Congress imbued a 
procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.”130  
 
 124. 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see also Fort Bend County v. 
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 
(1994). 
 125. Fort Bend County, 139 S. Ct. at 1848 (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013)). The subject matter jurisdiction issue in 2019 was 
whether “Title VII’s charge-filing precondition to suit [is] a ‘jurisdictional’ 
requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding; or is . . . a procedural 
prescription mandatory if timely raised, but subject to forfeiture if tardily asserted.” 
Id. at 1846. 
 126. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (asserting that 
the copyright registration prerequisite for suing was not jurisdictional). In 2019, 
the Court approved the registration prerequisite to sue when a defendant timely 
moved to dismiss. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 
139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). 
 127. Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1848 (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 
455 (2004)). 
 128. Id. at 1849. 
 129. 564 U.S. 462, 479–80 (2011) (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 
434 (2011). 
 130. 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015). 
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The federal court has subject matter jurisdiction in equity 
to grant the equitable remedy of an injunction, which includes a 
broad, even nationwide, injunction. 
2. Equity Jurisdiction 
What is equity jurisdiction and how does equity jurisdiction 
fit with subject matter jurisdiction in determining the difference 
between void and erroneous judgments? Courts’ decisions about 
equity jurisdiction are decisions about whether to grant an equi-
table remedy and, if so, what form it should take. 
Chafee discussed courts’ fuzzy thinking about equity juris-
diction. He began by addressing the limited federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction that exists when the Constitution and statutes 
grant the courts power because the United States district court 
has Article III power in “Equity.” As a court of equity, the judge 
has power to grant an injunction. The court, we assume, has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. If so, the judge has subject 
matter jurisdiction. The judge’s subject matter jurisdiction 
means that the judge’s decisions about equity jurisdiction and 
the judge’s injunction decision are valid, not void.131 
Lack of equity jurisdiction, Chafee maintained, means that 
an injunction is erroneous. It does not mean the injunction is 
void. Equity jurisdiction is not jurisdictional. “[T]oday, with law 
and equity merged in a single court, equity jurisdiction . . . is 
simply a bundle of sound principles of decision concerning par-
ticular kinds of relief.”132 
A court’s decision about equity jurisdiction is not a question 
of power but one of judgment, discretion, and wisdom. Chafee 
doubted “if there are any truly void decrees from courts with eq-
uity powers, except for lack of jurisdiction over the person.”133 
Courts have jurisdiction to decide both bad claims and good 
claims. A federal district judge with subject matter jurisdiction 
in equity to grant an injunction has equitable discretion to grant 
an injunction that is erroneous. “In cases of doubt, it is wise to 
let the rule in question operate merely as a principle of right de-
cision like most other judge-made and statutory rules.”134 Char-
acterizing a valid but erroneous injunction as a void one is, 
 
 131. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 304. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 374. 
 134. Id. at 311. 
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Chafee wrote, “a clumsy way to get rapid review of [an] espe-
cially objectionable decree . . . .”135 
Equity jurisdiction, in Chafee’s better view, does not limit 
the federal courts’ power to decide. It deals, in Chief Justice 
Stone’s words, with “whether the case is one for the peculiar type 
of relief which a court of equity is competent to give.”136 If it is 
the latter, a federal district court judge has subject matter juris-
diction to decide the issues in this lawsuit and to grant this 
plaintiff relief—a national government injunction—if “the case 
is one for the peculiar type of relief which a court of equity is 
competent to give.”137 
The court’s subject matter jurisdiction to grant an injunc-
tion includes the power to grant an incorrect injunction. An er-
roneous nationwide national government injunction does not 
show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or power, but a mis-
taken use of power: it is incorrect, but it is not void. 
The legal system, Chafee insisted, needs an avenue for 
“rapid relief from a very obnoxious kind of injunction.”138 This 
avenue takes the form of stays and accelerated appeals. A de-
fendant who disagrees with an injunction should move to modify 
or dissolve it, or file an appeal, instead of violating the injunction 
and arguing against it if charged with criminal contempt. Be-
cause he favored respect for the law and the rule of law, Chafee 
condemned the defendant’s disobedience. “Respect for courts,” 
he wrote, “will best be promoted by a hard and fast rule that all 
valid decrees must be obeyed until set aside by a judge.”139 
If an early analogy vindicates equity jurisdiction for a na-
tionwide national government injunction, the writ of mandamus 
in Marbury v. Madison is an early analogy to the national gov-
ernment injunction. “The very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection 
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first du-
ties of government is to afford that protection.”140 Mandamus, 
an order to a defendant to do something within the defendant’s 
 
 135. Id. at 380. 
 136. Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins., 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935). 
 137.  Id.  
 138. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 347. 
 139. Id. at 360. 
 140. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 161 (1803). 
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duty,141 is a functional mandatory injunction. The mandamus in 
Marbury is a legal remedy by an individual against the federal 
executive. The legal writs—mandamus and prohibition—pro-
vided specific relief against government misconduct and served 
as precursors of injunctions.142 
While mandamus withered, the injunction flourished. The 
injunction became a remedy of choice: the central prospective eq-
uitable remedy. Pfander and Wentzel’s careful research shows 
several crucial points.143 Technicalities chipped away at federal 
mandamus. State courts nevertheless adopted and broadened 
the legal writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition to sup-
press improper government measures. When the state courts 
perceived the legal writs were no longer adequate legal reme-
dies, they turned to equity and the injunction remedy to stop 
improper government measures and to obviate a multiplicity of 
suits. After Congress enacted the federal courts’ general federal 
question jurisdiction in 1875, the federal courts turned to these 
state equity precedents to wield injunctions against government 
overreach.144 
Pfander and Wentzel correctly reproach the national gov-
ernment injunction’s critics for equitable originalism, for looking 
too narrowly for support only on the equity side, and for over-
looking the permeability between state and federal courts as 
well as between legal and equitable remedies. “A jurisprudence 
of constitutional remedies that measures the legitimate scope of 
modern federal equity by looking to the practices of the High 
Court of Chancery, circa 1789, will,” they wrote, “capture only a 
partial view of the remedies available to suitors in the early re-
public.”145 
The difficult contemporary decision for equity jurisdiction 
and subject matter jurisdiction is Justice Scalia’s 1999 majority 
opinion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond 
 
 141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018) (noting that mandamus empowers federal 
courts to compel certain government officials and agencies “to perform a duty owed 
to the plaintiff”). 
 142. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 4 n.13). 
 143. Id. (manuscript at 33). 
 144. Pfander and Wentzel use this history to reach Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), where the Supreme Court approved a federal injunction that forbade a state 
attorney general from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute and contempt for 
its violation. See generally Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105. 
 145. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 10–11). 
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Fund, Inc.146 The Court’s divided decision held that in a general 
creditor’s transitory contract action to recover a debt of money 
damages, the federal district court could not grant the creditor-
plaintiff an asset-freezing injunction against its debtor. An as-
set-freezing injunction is an interlocutory injunction that bars a 
defendant from thwarting the plaintiff’s later efforts to collect a 
money judgment. A federal district court could grant a plaintiff 
an asset-freezing injunction only if a statute allowed one or if the 
plaintiff demanded an equitable remedy but not monetary 
damages.147 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion sought “an authority to ad-
minister in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial 
remedies which had been devised and was being administered 
by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation 
of the two countries.”148 It went on to hold that “[b]ecause such 
a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity, we 
hold that the District Court had no authority to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction preventing [defendants] from disposing of their 
assets pending adjudication of [plaintiffs’] contract claim for 
money damages.”149 
If equity jurisdiction included only those remedies adminis-
tered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the sepa-
ration of the two countries, then this static originalism and plain 
meaning is classic Scalia. He misses the merger of law and eq-
uity as well as the rise of the injunction. He seems, however, to 
pass over the question of whether equity jurisdiction is jurisdic-
tional. He overlooks the traditional distinction between, on one 
hand, absence of power or subject matter jurisdiction which 
leads to voidness and, on the other, equity jurisdiction and mis-
taken use of power which leads to erroneousness. 
Alliance Bond Fund lacks the hallmarks of subject matter 
jurisdiction. An asset-freezing injunction is not forbidden; it is 
available when the plaintiff sues for an equitable remedy or un-
 
 146. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). This draws on the treatment in Chapter 7 of DOUG 
RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND 
CONTEMPT 895 (2010), that emphasizes the decision’s international and debtor-
creditor features. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: 
Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000). 
 147. See Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. at 326–27 (noting that the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 did not give courts the power to grant the relief sought by respondents). 
 148. Id. at 318 (quoting Atlas Life Ins. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 
(1939)). 
 149. Id. at 333. 
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der a statute. An asset-freezing injunction is a serious innova-
tion. It is usually interlocutory based on incomplete procedure. 
It is disconnected from the merits—a money judgment. Its clos-
est relative is pre-judgment attachment. 
As we will see below, the judge may grant a nationwide na-
tional government injunction to an injunction class. This availa-
bility of a national government injunction militates against the 
idea that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or equitable 
jurisdiction to grant one in a non-class action. Chafee’s tie-
breaker between voidness and error is equity jurisdiction: “In 
cases of doubt, it is wise to let the rule in question operate merely 
as a principle of right decision like most other judge-made and 
statutory rules.”150 
In her Alliance Bond Fund dissent, Justice Ginsburg was 
wiser about equity jurisdiction. She wrote that the principles of 
equity include the more general principle that the Court is able 
to grant an injunction when the plaintiff’s remedy at law is in-
adequate. “[T]he Court,” she wrote, “relies on an unjustifiably 
static conception of equity jurisdiction.”151 Equitable relief may 
only be limited by statute. Equity is flexible; it evolves over 
time.152 The merger of law and equity as well as other develop-
ments mean that a contemporary plaintiff may seek an injunc-
tion and damages in a single lawsuit. Because equity grows with 
the changing times, Justice Ginsburg argued, the Court has eq-
uity jurisdiction to grant an appropriate plaintiff an asset-
freezing injunction.153 With respect, Justice Ginsburg’s view is 
better than Justice Scalia’s because it is soundly based in history 
and policy.  
Justice Ginsburg is not the only jurist to espouse that idea. 
“If the law is to survive and flourish,” the late Judge Patricia 
Wald said in a speech,  
 
 150. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 311. 
 151. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also 
Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 8) (“More troubling yet, [the 
critics] may deprive equity of its characteristic ability to adapt to changes in the 
remedial system as a whole.”). 
 152. See Frost, supra note 9, at 1084. Frost subscribes to Justice Ginsburg’s view 
of equity jurisdiction but does not footnote Justice Ginsburg’s idea that equity 
evolves to solve new problems. 
 153. But Justice Ginsburg goes too far in approving the asset-freezing injunction 
on appeal; the debtor’s preference shouldn’t be enough to qualify the creditor for an 
asset-freezing injunction. See David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions 
Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2172 (2005). 
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it must change and develop through experience, application 
to new situations, testing in new circumstances, infusion of 
new knowledge. Today, it seems, we shy from that philosophy 
for fear it may draw the stigma of “legal activism.” But labels 
are deceiving and too often intimidating. The truth is that life 
does change and the law must adapt to that inevitability.154 
Lack of standing may be a defect in subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Critics of nationwide national government injunctions com-
bine questions about plaintiffs’ standing with jurisdiction.155 
Professor Frost responds correctly, in my view, that standing de-
fines entry—the threshold of litigation—but not remedy. After 
deciding for the plaintiff on the merits, the appropriate remedy 
will be determined by the judge.156 To seek an injunction, a 
plaintiff must have both “remedial standing” and injury. Reme-
dial standing stems from the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.157 Lyons sued the City and sought 
an injunction; he claimed that a police officer’s use of a choke 
hold on him was unconstitutional misconduct. The Court held 
that, while Lyons might have standing to recover damages for 
his past injury, he lacked standing to sue for an injunction to bar 
the future use of choke holds by L.A. police officers unless he 
could show that he was threatened with a choke hold in the 
future.158 
While plaintiffs must, at the beginning of a lawsuit, assert 
their own interests and have standing to seek an injunction, at 
the end of the lawsuit the judge has equitable discretion to de-
fine the breadth and extent of injunctive relief. In Martin v. 
 
 154. Adam Bernstein, Patricia Wald, Pathbreaking Federal Judge Who Became 
Chief of D.C. Circuit, Dies at 90, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/patricia-wald-pathbreaking-federal-
judge-who-became-chief-of-dc-circuit-dies-at-90/2019/01/12/6ab03904-1688-11e9-
803c-4ef28312c8b9 [https:// https://perma.cc/KS3S-8ELH]; see also Capper, supra 
note 153, at 2169–70 (“[Justice Scalia] envisages an inordinately narrow ability for 
courts of equity to mold the remedies they grant over time to meet changing 
circumstances.”). 
 155. Bray, supra note 11; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- 
and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other 
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2016); Morley, supra note 
11. 
 156. Frost, supra note 9, at 1083; see also Alan M. Trammell, The 
Constitutionality of Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 979–84 
(2020). 
 157. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 158. Id. at 111; see also Trammell, supra note 156, at 979–84. 
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Franklin Capital Corp., Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Discretion 
is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards 
helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should 
be decided alike.”159 
At that stage, the judge’s remedial power may extend be-
yond the plaintiffs’ complete relief without encroaching on Arti-
cle III’s case or controversy prerequisite. Trammell gives the ex-
ample of broad, future-oriented structural injunctions.160 The 
argument that nonparties lack standing either to seek or to ben-
efit from a nationwide injunction is unsuccessful when plaintiffs 
have standing at the beginning of their lawsuits. 
State attorneys general have been regular proponents of na-
tionwide national government injunctions. Their “standing” has 
been controversial.161 Scholars have argued in favor of a pre-
sumption that the Constitution and statutes protect individual, 
not state, interests.162 
To begin, state attorneys general suing to curb federal exec-
utive lawbreaking illustrate federalism’s system of checks and 
balances.163 They bring resources, expertise, and depth to op-
pose formidable federal lawyers.164 In addition to federal 
lawbreaking’s effect on the state governments themselves, the 
attorneys general are in parens patraie relationships to their 
constituents.165 Professor Crocker said that state government 
standing is analogous to organizational standing and is even 
easier to sustain.166 
 
 159. 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005). 
 160. Trammell, supra note 9, at 84–89, n.108. 
 161.  See Symposium, Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure: State Standing, 
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883 (2019); Grove, supra note 92. 
 162. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Standing, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2015 (2019). 
 163. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Bradford Mank & 
Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1955 (2019). Fred Barbash, Litigation Against Executive Branch by Coalitions 
of States Grows in Response to Unilateral Actions by President and Gridlocked 





 164. F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the 
President, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83, 97 (2018); Mank & Solimine, supra note 163. 
 165. Hessick & Marshall, supra note 164, at 105 (arguing to relax injury in fact); 
Mank & Solimine, supra note 163. 
 166. Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057 (2019). 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:12 PM 
926 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
The scope of an injunction is a matter of equity jurisdiction, 
not subject matter jurisdiction; it hinges on the judge’s exercise 
of discretion in light of the principles of sound decision-making. 
An injunction that is too broad is erroneous, not void. 
3. The Rise of the Injunction 
When the twentieth century started, the federal courts’ in-
junctions were a conservative tool. These anti-progressive in-
junctions against state regulation gave the injunction a bad 
name. In Ex parte Young, for example, a federal judge held the 
Minnesota attorney general in contempt for suing to enforce a 
Minnesota maximum rate statute.167 In the late 1930s, the New 
Deal Court circumscribed the Lochner-era decisions that struck 
down state regulatory statutes on substantive due process 
grounds.168 In addition, the federal courts’ injunctions against 
labor strikes were a scandal. Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to curb federal strike injunctions.169 The courts’ 
conservatism waned during the first half of the century. 
Several developments boosted the injunction to become the 
courts’ major equitable remedy. Law and equity were merged; 
plaintiffs could seek both legal damages and an equitable injunc-
tion in a single lawsuit. Another development was the decline of 
the maxim that “equity protects only property rights” which, for 
one thing, circumscribed the Chancellor’s ability to protect 
plaintiffs’ personal or constitutional rights.170 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court made a telling argument against 
this maxim in Kenyon v. City of Chicopee.171 Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses sued to enjoin local authorities’ harassment through 
criminal prosecutions. The authorities argued that a court could 
grant an injunction to protect the plaintiffs’ “property rights” to 
conduct a business, but it could not grant an injunction to protect 
their “personal rights,” such as free speech and free exercise of 
religion. “We are impressed,” the court said, “by the plaintiffs’ 
 
 167. 209 U.S. 123, 141 (1908).  
 168. FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 103–26; DAVID KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM 
FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1924–1945, at 334–37 
(1999); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT 429–35, 444–56, 518–24 (2010). 
 169. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110 (2018) (barring federal injunctions against strikes 
except in limited circumstances). 
 170. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1–9 (1978). 
 171. 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1946). 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2020  5:12 PM 
2020] INJUNCTIONS ON ILLEGAL EXECUTIVE ACTIVITY 927 
suggestion that if equity would safeguard their right to sell ba-
nanas it ought to be at least equally solicitous of their personal 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.”172 Present-day state 
and federal courts grant plaintiffs injunctions to protect many 
kinds of “personal” rights. 
The earlier approach was that an equity court would not re-
solve disputes of a “peculiarly political nature” because they 
were more properly resolved by legislative or executive 
action.173 But in 1962, the Supreme Court held that apportion-
ment of congressional districts was justiciable.174 And present-
day courts adjudicate many “political” disputes, including 
nationwide national government injunctions.175 
Two other examples show reclassification of equitable juris-
diction. First, earlier equity courts claimed lack of equitable ju-
risdiction to award punitive damages. After law and equity 
merged, the New York Court of Appeals, drawing on the whole 
body of merged law and equity, approved an injunction alongside 
punitive damages.176 Second, other earlier equity courts claimed 
that equity lacked jurisdiction to enjoin libel. After the merger, 
the court has jurisdiction which may not be exercised under the 
maxim that “equity will not enjoin a libel.”177 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion struck down legalized school segregation and gave the in-
junction a special prominence and new moral legitimacy.178 The 
decades-long process of federal courts actually issuing injunc-
tions to desegregate public schools developed courts’ self-confi-
dence and expertise.179 
Other parallel changes in the broader world of government 
and policy fueled the development of the national government 
injunction. These changes included consolidation of the Presi-
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
 174. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 175. But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that 
partisan gerrymandering is a political question and not justiciable). 
 176. I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1963); see also 
DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 399–
400 (9th ed. 2018). 
 177. Organovo Holdings v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 115 (Del. Ch. 2017) (quoting 
Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 356 (2d Cir. 1913)). 
 178.  347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
 179. Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty: A Golden 
Anniversary or a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School 
Desegregation Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1575 (2004). 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:12 PM 
928 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
dent’s power at the expense of Congress and the rise of the ac-
tivist federal executive. They are examined above in this 
Article.180 
4. The Structural Injunction and the National 
Government Injunction 
Support for the federal courts’ authority to grant national 
government injunctions is also shown by the widespread use of 
structural injunctions, which are close relatives of the national 
government injunction. Comparing the structural injunction to 
the national government injunction supplies background and 
perspective.  
Structural injunctions are remedies in injunction class ac-
tions, usually on behalf of a racial or other minority group. 
Structural-injunction plaintiffs usually accuse a state or local 
government defendant of violating the Constitution or a federal 
statute. A few years ago, when I wrote my article on future rem-
edies in constitutional litigation,181 the defendants in structural 
injunction litigation were state and local government officials. 
Although the official is the named defendant, the government 
institution is the functional defendant. Beginning with schools, 
mental hospitals, prisons, police departments, and law enforce-
ment, federal judges enjoined state and local officials to bring 
the institutions into compliance with, usually, the Constitution 
and federal statutes.182 
Today, the need to curb illegal and unconstitutional govern-
ment activity means including the federal government as a de-
fendant and demanding the remedy of a national government 
injunction instead of a structural injunction. Like a structural 
injunction, a national government injunction forbids a federal-
official defendant from pursuing a policy that violates the Con-
stitution or a federal statute, although under a national govern-
ment injunction the official defendant is a federal government 
agent rather than a state government agent. 
Plaintiffs differ in structural injunctions and national gov-
ernment injunctions. In contrast to its role as the defendant in 
national government injunctions, the federal executive has par-
 
 180. KRUSE & ZELIZER, supra note 45. 
 181. Rendleman, supra note 50. 
 182. FISS, supra note 170, at 1–9; see also Trammell, supra note 156, at 988–96 
(providing a structural injunction background for nationwide injunctions). 
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ticipated on the plaintiff side in structural injunction 
litigation.183 In this litigation, the federal executive has man-
aged many negotiations leading to consent decrees.184 
In both structural injunctions and national government in-
junctions, the plaintiff asks the court to curb or reorganize a gov-
ernment institution to achieve compliance with the law. Both 
the federal and the state government switch sides in national 
government injunctions: the federal executive is the defendant 
and the plaintiffs often include state attorneys general. 
The first stage in a structural injunction lawsuit is deciding 
the defendant’s liability by determining whether the defendant 
is violating the substantive law. In a lawsuit resulting in a na-
tional government injunction, the judge’s finding that the fed-
eral defendant violated the Constitution or a statute is 
equivalent to the liability stage in a structural injunction. 
At the next stage, the judge crafts a remedy that is negative 
and preventive: the official defendant’s violations must stop. The 
injunction resembles a personalized statute that forbids the de-
fendant’s misconduct. A structural injunction then requires the 
parties and the judge to look to the future to rebuild an institu-
tion that has gone legally astray. In Professor Owen Fiss’s 
words, a structural injunction “seeks to effectuate the reorgani-
zation of an ongoing social institution.”185 Since structural in-
junction lawsuits are usually brought against state or local 
officials, the injunction is not nationwide but statewide or local. 
A national government injunction has the same negative, 
preventive feature; it protects plaintiffs’ important statutory or 
constitutional rights by forbidding the government from pursu-
ing an illegal policy. A national government injunction makes 
explicit what is implicit in rule of law principles—that the gov-
ernment must follow its own constitutional and statutory rules. 
Correcting the injustice—cleaning up the mess—to protect 
plaintiffs’ rights and stop the illegal behavior may require a na-
tional government injunction to restructure an institution. An 
 
 183. See, e.g., Ayres v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 184. This has included consent decrees with big-city police departments. 
Attorney General Sessions later withdrew from these consent decrees. See Wesley 
Lowery & Matt Zapotosky, Democrats Demand Documents on Justice Dept. Police 




 185. FISS, supra note 170, at 7. 
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example of this is the judicial efforts to reunite families sepa-
rated under the Trump Administration’s zero-tolerance, family-
separation policies which, at this writing, are well into their sec-
ond year.186 
Two streams of analysis of the structural injunction coexist. 
One debates the structural injunction’s legitimacy; it sets critics’ 
arguments based on federalism and separation of powers 
against proponents’ responses based on plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights and defendants’ obedience to the law.187 A second stream 
discusses the injunction class action’s technical features, includ-
ing the idea that, even though a plaintiff class member receives 
no formal notice of the lawsuit, she will be precluded from relit-
igating a judgment for the defendant.188 
In the meantime, structural injunction litigation to protect 
plaintiff classes’ constitutional and statutory rights has moved 
forward, a servile drudge almost oblivious to the debates. First, 
the structural injunction lost its unitary nature and developed 
in separate, special substantive categories: education, prisons 
and jails, mental hospitals, etc. Second, the parties and the 
judges developed a practice of negotiation, leading to sometimes-
complex consent decrees. 
Actual structural injunction litigation in trial courts flies 
under professors’ appellate-based radar and ignores the debates 
over legitimacy and preclusion. It is usually out of sight, except 
when the parties ask the judge to approve a specialized and de-
tailed negotiated consent decree.189 Many structural injunctions 
have lasted for decades.190 Consent decrees are contested by de-
fendants’ motions to modify or dissolve.191 
 
 186. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 187. For a collection of the literature, see OWEN M FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, 
INJUNCTIONS 827–30 (1984). 
 188. David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its 
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 658 (2011). 
 189. National Digest: Judge Agrees to Plan for Court Supervised Changes to 




 190. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372–74 (1992); 
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 268–69 (1990); Ayres v. Thompson, 358 
F.3d 356, 359–61 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 191. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 
502 U.S. at 381–82. 
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The structural injunction has faced criticism on two major 
grounds: federalism and separation of powers. Critics charge 
that federal judges use injunctions to order state and local gov-
ernments around. A judge formulating, drafting, and imple-
menting a structural injunction is performing legislative and 
executive functions in developing a government program. 
A national government injunction—granted by a federal 
judge against a federal executive defendant—avoids the federal-
ism concerns found in structural injunctions. But the national 
government injunction makes up for the lack of federalism con-
cerns with increased tension from its strain on separation of 
powers. Stalwart defenders of legislative and executive power 
are offended by federal judges’ orders bringing federal institu-
tions into compliance.  
Like a structural injunction, a national government injunc-
tion is complex and can take a long time to implement. The judge 
may fall back on gradualism, incremental implementation of the 
plaintiffs’ rights, Brown II’s “all deliberate speed,” and trusting 
the local authorities.192 
Although controversial, national government injunctions 
and structural injunctions are necessary remedial tools for 
courts to grant plaintiffs relief and to curb illegal, perhaps un-
constitutional, federal and state government activity. 
5. Enforcement, Including Contempt 
This Article continues to compare structural injunctions 
and national government injunctions with a discussion of en-
forcement. 
Like structural injunctions, “severe sanctions are unlikely” 
in national government injunctions.193 The national 
government injunction, like the structural injunction, goes easy 
on the defendant. In addition to the direct expense of 
compliance, the defendant’s costs of structural litigation are the 
opprobrium of being sued for violating plaintiffs’ rights and be-
ing required to defend. 
In an ideal world, an injunction would be unnecessary. Rule 
of law principles, precedent, or a declaratory judgment would 
suffice to bring the defendant into compliance. If precedent suf-
 
 192. Rendleman, supra note 179, at 1585–87. 
 193. FISS, supra note 170, at 13. 
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fices, there is no need for a class action or an injunction.194 
“Where a question of law is decisive . . . the concept of stare de-
cisis furnishes almost the same advantages as a class action. . . . 
[A] decision on the law effectively binds non-parties without up-
setting our assurance that due process has been done . . . .”195 
The government would obey the apparent law as stated by the 
judge, an official with power to decide. However, the nation’s ex-
perience with Massive Resistance to school desegregation proves 
that “faith in precedent as a remedy is touching but perhaps na-
ive.”196 
A declaratory judgment is a court’s judgment that articu-
lates the law and tells the parties what their rights and obliga-
tions are.197 Because a declaratory judgment is not an order, 
defendants cannot be held in contempt for violating it. The in-
junction, which can be enforced through contempt proceedings, 
is the more effective remedy in most serious lawsuits. But as this 
Article will examine, judges do not employ harsh contempt sanc-
tions in lawsuits against the federal executive. 
Rule of law principles depend on defendants’ obedience to 
court orders and acceptance of judicial legitimacy.198 In early 
civil rights actions against state and local officials “a single gen-
eralization emerge[d]: courts hesitate to use contempt against 
government officials.”199 Sometimes defendants’ disobedience 
made contempt possible, but the disobedience was over-
looked.200 Both civil and criminal contempt occurred.201 Apart 
from contempt, a federal military presence accompanied deseg-
regation of Ole Miss and the Little Rock schools.202 The single 
recent contempt finding against a local official was the Kentucky 
 
 194. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 156 n.2. 
 195. Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 
9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 446 (1960). 
 196. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 160; see also Rendleman, supra note 179, at 
1609. 
 197. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 161–62. Roe v. Wade, one of the Supreme 
Court’s most contentious and controversial decisions, was a declaratory judgment. 
410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 198. Driesen, supra note 79, at 515. 
 199. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 169; see also Parrillo, supra note 93, at 702. 
 200. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 168 n.81. 
 201. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966); 
In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Halderman v. Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
 202. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–
1974, at 414–16, 477–78 (1996); Parrillo, supra note 93, at 741. 
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judge’s jailing of Kim Davis to coerce her to issue a marriage li-
cense to a same-sex couple.203 
The federal courts are easier on disobedient federal defend-
ants than they are on state defendants.204 And, normally, fed-
eral defendants obey court orders,205 in part because the Justice 
Department’s credibility with the federal courts depends on the 
government’s obedience to court orders.206 
Professor Parrillo’s complex and nuanced study of federal 
courts’ enforcement of injunctions against federal defendants 
concludes: 
First, the federal judiciary is willing to issue contempt find-
ings against federal agencies and officials. Second, while sev-
eral individual federal judges believe they can (and have tried 
to) attach sanctions to these findings, the judiciary as an in-
stitution—particularly the higher courts—has exhibited a 
virtually complete unwillingness to allow sanctions, at times 
intervening dramatically to block imprisonment or budget-
straining fines at the eleventh hour. Third, the higher courts, 
even as they unfailingly halt sanctions in all but a few minor 
instances, have bent over backward to avoid making author-
itative pronouncements that sanctions are categorically una-
vailable, thus keeping the sanctions issue in a state of low 
salience and at least nominal legal uncertainty. Fourth, even 
though contempt findings are practically devoid of sanctions, 
they nonetheless have a shaming effect that gives them sub-
stantial if imperfect deterrent power. The efficacy of judicial 
review of agency action rests primarily on a strong norm, 
shared in the overlapping communities that agency officials 
inhabit, that officials comply with court orders. Shame-induc-
ing contempt findings by judges are the means to weaponize 
that norm.207 
 
 203. Parrillo, supra note 93, at 741. 
 204. Id. at 702. 
 205. Grove, supra note 92 (noting that compliance norm grew out of the civil 
rights experience). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Parrillo, supra note 93, at 697. Compliance issues and measures after 
judicial voiding of federal agency measures include negotiations, drafting 
injunctions, scheduling compliance, defendants’ claims of difficulty and requests for 
delay, discovery to gather information (including depositions), proceedings to test 
agency good faith and agency reputational concerns, and finally, appellate courts’ 
reluctance to approve stern measures and contempt. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, 
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Federal court experience with contempt for violation of a na-
tional government injunction is limited. In Grace v. Sessions, 
when the government deported a likely beneficiary of the na-
tional government injunction, Judge Sullivan threatened con-
tempt: return Carmen or show cause against contempt.208 
As the editing process for this Article was in its final stages, 
federal Magistrate Judge Kim held the Secretary of Education, 
Betsy DeVos, in contempt for violating a preliminary injunction 
that required the Department of Education to stop collecting stu-
dent loans from defrauded students who had borrowed to attend 
a defunct, for-profit “college.” Magistrate Judge Kim’s $100,000 
compensatory contempt sanction will be used to repay the de-
frauded students for loan-servicing companies’ wage garnish-
ment and tax refund interceptions in violation of the order.209 
This use of compensatory contempt shows that federal courts 
know how to deal with a cabinet official’s violation of an order. 
That a magistrate judge without life tenure or salary protection 
sanctioned a breaching cabinet officer in contempt should inform 
executive branch officials that the judicial branch means busi-
ness and has the last word. 
In January 2020, in Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit reprobated the Justice De-
partment for ignoring the earlier remand order and referring to 
the earlier panel order as incorrect: “What happened next beg-
gars belief.”210 Judge Easterbrook continued:  
 We have never before encountered defiance of a remand or-
der, and we hope never to see it again. Members of the Board 
must count themselves lucky that Baez-Sanchez has not 
asked us to hold them in contempt, with all the consequences 
that possibility entails.  
 
Negotiating the Federal Government’s Compliance with Court Orders: An Initial 
Exploration, 97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019). 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
 208. No. 18-cv-1853 (EGS), 2018 WL 3812445, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2018) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 209. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Federal Judge Holds DeVos in Contempt in Loan 




 210. 947 F.3d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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 The Board seemed to think that we had issued an advisory 
opinion, and that faced with a conflict between our views and 
those of the Attorney General it should follow the latter.211  
The panel upheld the immigration judge’s order and directed the 
government to obey.212 The Seventh Circuit’s strong resolve and 
explicit language shows the judiciary’s commitment to compli-
ance, even by the federal government. 
Similarly, a Kentucky federal district judge’s willingness to 
jail local government official Kim Davis for refusing to comply 
with an order to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple 
also demonstrates federal courts’ resolve to implement the Con-
stitution and to ensure compliance with court orders.213 
Although the contempt litigation in Nevada v. United States 
Department of Labor is complex, lengthy, and cryptic, it may be 
an important precedent for holding the federal government in 
contempt for violating nationwide injunctions.214 States sued 
the U.S. Department of Labor in Texas to enjoin an Obama Ad-
ministration overtime rule. The Texas federal district judge 
granted a nationwide national government injunction forbidding 
implementation of the rule.215 A private plaintiff, Alvarez, filed 
a separate lawsuit in New Jersey for overtime under the rule. 
The Texas judge—using the “privity” concept from preclusion, 
not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)—found privity be-
tween the New Jersey plaintiff, Alvarez, and the Texas 
defendants; based on that finding, the court held Alvarez in con-
tempt.216 The Fifth Circuit reversed Alvarez’s nonparty 
contempt; the court held that there was neither privity nor Rule 
65(d)(2) active concert or participation between Alvarez and the 
defendant government department.217 Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit would have been wiser to decide the case under Rule 65(d)(2) 
without mentioning privity, its decision is important because the 
trial judge’s contempt order against a nonparty almost converted 
 
 211. Id. at 1035–36. 
 212. Id. at 1035–37. 
 213. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015), appeal 
dismissed and remanded, 2015 WL 9460311, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015). 
 214.  Nevada v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex. 
2017); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016). 
 215. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Nevada v. United 
States Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795. 
 216. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 724 (E.D. Tex. 2018), 
rev’d sub nom. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 217. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d at 214. 
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the injunction against the federal government into a statute that 
affected everyone in the United States. The Fifth Circuit’s cor-
rect decision limits contempt of a nationwide national injunction 
to the named defendant, agents, and others who are nonparties 
in active concert or participation with them.218 
In litigation against a state or federal government program 
with an uncooperative defendant, judges seldom resort to coer-
cive or punitive contempt techniques, but they keep these 
enforcement techniques in reserve to threaten, brandish, or em-
ploy only as a last resort. 
6. Equitable Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion 
“O, it is excellent / to have a giant’s strength; but it is tyran-
nous / To use it like a giant,”219 Isabella says in Measure for 
Measure. Following that advice, a court with jurisdiction should 
not always exercise it. The judge with broad subject matter ju-
risdiction to grant an injunction should exercise self-restraint 
and be careful about when and how to exercise that power.220 
The national government injunction falls under equitable 
jurisdiction and principles of judicial decision-making, equitable 
discretion, and action. What are those principles? 
Whether to grant a nationwide national government injunc-
tion is not a choice between remedies;221 it is a choice of scope of 
remedy. Whether a judge should grant a nationwide injunction 
or a more limited injunction is within the judge’s equitable dis-
cretion about how to draft and measure the remedy chosen, spe-
cifically the narrowness or breadth of the injunction. The judge 
who has already found that the government broke the law and 
that some kind of injunction is warranted will decide between 
issuing an injunction against only the federal official involved in 
the case or a broader injunction against all officials nationwide. 
Measurement-of-remedy decisions are more contextual and dis-
cretionary than choice-of-remedy decisions.222 
 
 218. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 878–80 (criticizing privity); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (discussing preclusion-res 
judicata and obedience to an injunction). 
 219.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2. 
 220. Douglas, supra note 70, at 34–35, 54–56. 
 221. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970). 
 222. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable 
Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1426–31, 1434–38 (2015). 
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Professor Chafee discussed disfavored forms of relief. He 
used the example of an appellate court’s decision to deny equity 
jurisdiction to hold that a trial judge’s temporary, mandatory in-
junction that shifted possession was void. Such an injunction, 
Chafee argued, may be erroneous, but it is not void.223 An incor-
rect national government injunction is a form of relief that falls 
under Chafee’s classification of a decision that is erroneous but 
not void. Equitable jurisdiction is not truly jurisdictional: federal 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction to grant a winning plain-
tiff a broad, nationwide national government injunction. 
Granting such an injunction involves principles of correct 
decision-making, balancing, and weighing. 
The Trump Administration seeks to end the nationwide na-
tional government injunctions that have enjoined many of the 
President’s policies.224 These efforts have so far failed. Even 
courts that are skeptical of nationwide national government in-
junctions have rejected the government’s “anti-nationwide 
injunctions” argument. For example, in limiting a nationwide in-
junction to its circuit, the Ninth Circuit in East Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant noted: “We have upheld nationwide injunctions where 
such breadth was necessary to remedy a plaintiff’s harm.”225 
The policy of providing relief to successful plaintiffs has pre-
vailed over arguments against broad injunctions. 
Having established the federal courts’ authority or equita-
ble jurisdiction to grant a nationwide national government 
injunction under principles of confinement, this Article next re-
sponds to critics’ other reasons to oppose national government 
injunctions. 
B. Forum Shopping 
Critics claim that nationwide national government injunc-
tions encourage forum shopping.226 Forum shopping occurs 
when a plaintiff chooses to sue in one court instead of another 
and hopes that the selected court will treat its case more favor-
ably than the rejected court would have. Whether forum 
 
 223. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 349. 
 224. See Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12. 
 225. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
 226. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11; 
Wasserman, supra note 10, at 616; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide 
Injunctions, supra note 12. 
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shopping is an abuse or an integral part of the adversary system 
is a controversial issue. 
The Supreme Court wrote that “[j]urisdiction and venue re-
quirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many plaintiffs 
are able to choose among several forums.”227 In addition to the 
jurisdiction-venue system, a lawyer has a duty to her client to 
select a beneficial forum. The choice of forum is often one of the 
plaintiff’s most important tactical decisions in a lawsuit.228 
The law gives litigants vertical and horizontal choices of fo-
rum. For a vertical example, a plaintiff suing a defendant from 
a different state may choose between state court general juris-
diction and federal court diversity jurisdiction. Federal diversity 
jurisdiction is based on forum shopping. A litigant who considers 
a federal court to be a more hospitable forum can choose that 
court.229 An out-of-state defendant in a state court may choose 
federal jurisdiction by removal.230 
A plaintiff has horizontal choices among states because per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue over the defendant are possible in 
several states. The broad federal venue statute means that a 
plaintiff can sue a federal executive official or the President al-
most anywhere in the United States.231 The plaintiff’s forum 
choice is entitled to paramount consideration.232 
There are arguments for discouraging litigant forum shop-
ping. Personal jurisdiction may be limited.233 Venue statutes, 
state long-arm statutes, and the forum non conveniens doctrine 
may also circumscribe plaintiffs’ choices.234 But within those 
broad limits, plaintiffs deciding where to file their lawsuits enjoy 
many options.235 
A lot of federal law is under the concurrent jurisdiction of 
state and federal courts, but national government injunction lit-
igation “arises under” federal law. Plaintiffs sue in federal court 
 
 227. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981). 
 228. Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 583 (2016). 
 229. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441 (2018). 
 230. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018). 
 231. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (permitting a federal officer 
sued in state court to remove to federal court); Kate Huddleston, Nationwide 
Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J. F. 242 (2017). 
 232. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981). 
 233. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
 234. STEPHEN YEAZELL & JOANNA SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 177–202 (10th 
ed. 2019). 
 235. Id. at 266. 
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because of federal question jurisdiction and the removal statute. 
Plaintiffs have a broad choice of federal venue. A plaintiff suing 
a federal executive defendant and seeking a national govern-
ment injunction cannot change the federal substantive law or 
federal procedure, but the plaintiff can select the district, divi-
sion, and, sometimes, the district court judge. In volatile and 
controversial national government injunction litigation, the 
judge makes a difference. 
Plaintiffs suing to upset an improper federal policy by seek-
ing a national government injunction will choose as favorable a 
forum as they can.236 A wide selection of states, and perhaps 
judges, is possible if several state attorneys general band to-
gether as plaintiffs. 
This reality of modern jurisdiction and venue rules is not a 
reason to forbid judges from granting a national government in-
junction. A plaintiff’s selection of a favorable trial judge may, 
however, militate against the idea that the judge will take pre-
cautions against disfavoring the defendant.  
C. Conflicting Injunctions 
Professor Lon Fuller argued that courts cannot handle 
amorphous “polycentric” disputes.237 If this argument was ever 
persuasive, however, time has since passed it by. In addition to 
resolving individual disputes, courts also refine, develop, and 
create law.238 The minimalist view of litigation as merely dis-
pute resolution has been subordinated to the historically and 
theoretically correct view that courts articulate public values 
and advance public goals in public law litigation.239 The late 
 
 236. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, In Weaponized Courts, Judge Who Halted 
Affordable Care Act Is a Conservative Favorite, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/us/judge-obamacare-reed-oconnor.html [https://
perma.cc/HPR2-6E2Y]. 
 237. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
394–404 (1978). 
 238. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, & MAURICE ROSENBERG, 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2–3 (1976); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN 
LIFE (1991); see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 
5–6 (1988). 
 239. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (1976); Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1979); Trammell, supra note 156, at 986 (dispute-resolution model of 
adjudication fails). 
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Professor Abram Chayes observed that “the dominating charac-
teristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise 
out of disputes between private parties about private rights. In-
stead, the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional 
or statutory policies.”240 School desegregation, prison conditions 
litigation, class actions for injunctions and damages, and multi-
district litigation show courts handling complex polycentric 
disputes. 
Duplicative, confusing litigation occurs when several plain-
tiffs file multiple lawsuits against the same federal policy in sev-
eral federal courts. Such litigation furrows critics’ brows.241 The 
federal court system cannot coordinate multiple plaintiffs seek-
ing relief from improper executive measures. Several lawsuits 
are likely. State attorneys general joining together in one law-
suit brings a measure of cooperation and uniformity to 
numerous lawsuits. 
Domestic litigation does not have a rule like the interna-
tional doctrine of lis alibi pendens that prefers the first to file. 
Lis alibi pendens, which is based in international comity, allows 
a court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when parallel litigation 
is pending in another jurisdiction.242 In the federal system, con-
solidation243 and multidistrict litigation244 are the only 
possibilities. Multidistrict litigation is not a well-suited tech-
nique to consolidate fast-paced national government injunction 
lawsuits against a defendant pursued by different plaintiffs in 
related actions.245 
This reality creates a risk of conflicting injunctions, or an 
injunction in one lawsuit and a decision for the government in a 
second lawsuit. This risk is not a reason to abolish national gov-
 
 240. Chayes, supra note 239 at 1284. 
 241. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 242. Mof’Oluwawo OluwaPelumi MojolaOluwa, Private International Law and 
the Doctrine of Lis Alibi Pendens (2017) (unpublished manuscript). 
 243. FED. R. CIV. P. 42. 
 244. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
 245. Parallel litigation between the same parties is easier. A federal court may 
defer to an earlier lawsuit between the same parties on the same transaction or 
event in another district. The first court may enjoin the second lawsuit. The second 
court may stay its later-filed lawsuit. Either court may consolidate and transfer, 
usually to the first. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3854, at 15 (4th ed. 2019); Andrew J. 
Fuller, A “Procedural Nightmare”: Dueling Courts and the Application of the First-
Filed Rule, 69 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2017). 
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ernment injunctions. Rather, it is a reason to trust federal 
judges’ professionalism. Careful and observant judges will exer-
cise respect and comity for the parallel litigation. 
Litigation about antisuit injunctions provides an example of 
the system dealing with complexity and conflict.246 Complexity 
and parallel litigation have also emerged in national govern-
ment injunction litigation. The injunctions surrounding the 
Trump Administration’s policy to bar Central Americans and 
other migrants from requesting asylum at the southern border 
is one example of courts successfully muddling through multiple 
lawsuits and conflicting orders. 
A federal district court judge in Washington, D.C., Judge 
Timothy J. Kelly, declined to block the policy.247 Shortly there-
after, Judge Jon Tigar in San Francisco temporarily blocked the 
policy, setting up conflicting orders and a potential race to fed-
eral appellate courts. In his decision, Judge Tigar noted that the 
federal government’s frustrations with rising border crossings 
did not justify “shortcutting the law” and, in reference to the op-
posite finding in the Washington litigation, said each judge must 
render his or her own decision: “We have the appellate courts to 
sort this out for us.”248 
Judge Tigar’s order prevented the policy from being carried 
out until the legal issues could be fully debated. He based his 
decision on Ninth Circuit precedent, which he said “consistently 
recognized the authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful pol-
icies on a universal basis.”249 He further stated that “[w]hile the 
government disagrees with that ruling, it provides no contrary 
authority from the immigration context and ‘no grounds on 
which to distinguish this case from [the Ninth Circuit’s] uncon-
 
 246. James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1958); see also Frost, 
supra note 9, at 1105 n.173; Scott Graham, Skilled in the Art: My Injunction Can 
Beat Your Injunction + FTC Says Competition is Good for 5G + My, What 




 247.  Maria Sacchetti & Spencer Hsu, Federal Judge in California Halts Trump’s 




 248. Id.  
 249. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 960 (N.D.Cal. 
2019) (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255 (9th Cir. 
2018)). 
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troverted line of precedent.’”250 “I’m sure [the other judge has] 
given this matter as much thought as I have,” Judge Tigar 
added. He later elaborated, “My point is that these are two dis-
trict courts both trying to do their best work on an issue of 
national importance.”251 
In the appeal following Judge Tigar’s order, the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied the government’s motion to stay the nationwide 
preliminary injunction.252 The court stated that the government 
had not shown that it was likely to prevail on the merits but 
noted that the trial judge had “failed to discuss whether a na-
tionwide injunction is necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged 
harm.”253 The court stayed the trial judge’s nationwide injunc-
tion in states outside the Ninth Circuit and sent the nationwide 
feature back to the district court for proof and findings of plain-
tiffs’ nationwide harm.254 
The dissent emphasized that national immigration law 
called for uniformity: “Should asylum law be administered dif-
ferently in Texas than in California?”255 The majority 
responded:  
[T]he fact that injunctive relief may temporarily cause the 
Rule to be administered inconsistently in different locations 
is not a sound reason for imposing relief that is broader than 
necessary. . . . [O]ur law requires that injunctive relief be nar-
rowly tailored to remedy the plaintiffs’ alleged harm, and it 
may only be broadened “if such breadth is necessary to give 
prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”256 
On remand, Judge Tigar said that “the Court grants the Organ-
izations’ motion to restore the nationwide scope of the 
 
 250. Id. (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d at 1256). 
 251. Miriam Jordan & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump’s Latest Attempt to Bar 
Asylum Seekers Is Blocked After a Day of Dueling Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/us/asylum-ruling-tro.html [https://
perma.cc/2L46-2GRU]; Ross Todd, SF Judge Again Blocks Trump’s Changes to 
Asylum Rules, LAW.COM (July 24, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.law.com
/therecorder/2019/07/24/sf-judge-again-blocks-trumps-changes-to-asylum-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9BW-T574]. 
 252.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 253.  Id. at 1029. 
 254. Id. at 1029, 1030–31. 
 255. Id. at 1032 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
 256. Id. at 1030 n.8 (majority opinion) (quoting Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 
1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis omitted). 
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injunction.”257 Two days later, the Supreme Court stayed the na-
tionwide injunction pending appeal.258 
Judge Tigar’s nationwide order in California affected an 
identical lawsuit in the District of Columbia, where the judge 
had denied the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order.259 The 
Supreme Court’s stay resolved the confusion. 
Judge Tigar’s points about complexity and conflicting deci-
sions are significant. The professional qualities of a “judicial 
temperament”—which include emotional detachment, patience, 
courtesy, respect, and civility—carry over to a judge’s relations 
with other judges. District court judges trust and rely on other 
judges’ competence and professionalism.260 In the end, the pro-
cess, the Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court will sort the 
issues out. Complexity and potential conflict are not reasons to 
limit injunction remedies. 
Another solution to this problem of conflicting orders might 
have been for Judge Tigar to issue an order that excluded the 
judicial districts, states, or federal circuits where an inconsistent 
decision or order already existed. Such an order would achieve 
one goal at the expense of another, however, for it would contra-
dict the policy of uniformity. 
D. Politicized Litigation 
In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “[t]here is 
hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”261 Since then, the courts’ 
role in United States political matters has expanded.262 Critics 
 
 257.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974, 985 (N.D. Cal. 
2019), granting stay, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019). 
 258. Id. A superseding order from the Court of Appeals that emphasized 
uniformity in immigration matters and complete relief had reinstated Judge Tigar’s 
“universal” order. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779–80 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 259.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 934 F.3d at 1030 n.6. 
 260. Trammell, supra note 9. 
 261. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1848). 
 262. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 209–10 
(Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 1998). 
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argue that the national government injunction politicizes litiga-
tion.263 
A plaintiff’s lawsuit against a national or state government 
program has an inescapable political component because the 
government established the program.264 If the plaintiff’s lawsuit 
succeeds, the political winners become the lawsuit’s losers. 
When the plaintiff is a state attorney general, the addition of 
another government actor increases the political quality of the 
lawsuit seeking a national government injunction. A lawsuit 
brought by an elected state official against the President to void 
an executive order strikes the rawest political and partisan 
nerves. The judge hearing such a case will know that someone 
powerful and important will be upset by the decision. 
The argument that the national government injunction po-
liticizes the judiciary misses the point that a strong argument 
can be made that the federal judiciary already is politicized and, 
perhaps, partisan. The Robert Bork and Justice Clarence 
Thomas hearings and votes were partisan. The Bush v. Gore rul-
ing used Republican votes to award the White House to a 
Republican President.265 The Citizens United ruling advantaged 
Republicans.266 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell re-
fused to hold hearings on President Obama’s Supreme Court 
nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, for a year. McConnell then 
changed Senate voting procedure to approve President Trump’s 
nominees by a simple majority. Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomi-
nation was a partisan appointment from beginning to end. The 
Senate hearings for Judge Kavanaugh were partisan political 
events conducted eight weeks before congressional elections. Fi-
nally, Judge Kavanaugh’s angry partisan attack on Democrats 
in his nomination hearing and Trump’s partisan screed at Jus-
tice Kavanaugh’s swearing-in ceremony raise the question 
whether appointments to the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Court itself are not only political but also partisan.267 As a result 
 
 263. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 264. BUDIANSKY, supra note 26, at 287–88. 
 265.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 266.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 267. Sheldon Whitehouse, Sen. Whitehouse: There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, LAW.COM (Feb. 15, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.law.com
/nationallawjournal/2019/02/15/sen-whitehouse-theres-a-crisis-of-credibility-at-
the-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/HUG4-CX86]. 
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of Trump’s appointment of Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme 
Court and the ongoing Republican partisan staffing of the lower 
federal courts, the Democrats and their allies might lose their 
ability to sue to upset Trump policies. 
The federal district courts and federal courts of appeals are 
also politicized. Newspapers writing about a judge or court deci-
sion usually identify the President who appointed the judge or 
judges.268 Careful empirical scholarship has demonstrated that 
the President who appointed a judge has predictive value across 
a broad spectrum of litigation.269 
Trump’s criticism of federal judges has drawn courts deeper 
into the political realm. Trump called Chief Justice Roberts “an 
absolute disaster.”270 He accused a federal judge of bias because 
of his family’s Mexican heritage. Chief Justice Roberts re-
sponded: “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush 
judges or Clinton judges. [. . .] What we have is an extraordinary 
group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right 
to those appearing before them. That independent judiciary is 
something we should all be thankful for.”271 Trump responded: 
“Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have 
‘Obama judges,’ [. . .] and they have a much different point of 
view than the people who are charged with the safety of our 
country.”272 
While courts inevitably make political decisions, it is wrong 
to say that courts make only political decisions. This Article ac-
cepts much of Chief Justice Roberts’ response. It is based on the 
idealistic idea that United States judges are detached profes-
sionals who are devoted to the neutral rule of law. However, it is 
tempered by the realism of a partisan judicial-selection process 
and a system that permits plaintiffs who file where they think 
they can prevail. The political lawsuit, the forum-shopped judge, 
 
 268. Shira A. Scheindlin, We Should All Defend Judges, LAW.COM (Nov. 29, 
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/11/29/we-should-
all-defend-judges/ [https://perma.cc/2BXK-K287]. 
 269. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class 
Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3097&context= 
faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/L7RZ-P7CG]. 
 270.  Adam Liptak, Roberts Rebukes Trump for Swipe at ‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-
chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/4LW2-K5PA]. 
 271.  Id. 
 272. Id. 
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and the politicized judiciary mean that a detached and collegial 
appellate court ought to be available and standing by. 
E. Percolation 
 “Percolation” expresses the idea that it is helpful for Su-
preme Court justices to have well-developed arguments about 
the issues in the appeals they decide. This requires decisions by 
several district court judges and two or three courts of appeals 
to develop and clarify the issues.273 The critics insist that one 
national government injunction by one district judge short-
circuits thorough percolation of issues, complaints, briefs, and 
decisions. Percolation is a useful tool for a Supreme Court that 
controls its own docket and decides an average of seventy-five 
cases a year from more than three hundred thousand lawsuits 
in federal district courts and over fifty thousand appeals in fed-
eral courts of appeals.274 
In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit limited a district judge’s 
nationwide injunction to apply only to the states in its circuit.275 
In the absence of proof, findings of fact, and conclusions of law 
demonstrating that the plaintiffs needed nationwide relief, the 
court emphasized percolation: “To permit such broad injunctions 
as a general rule, without an articulated connection to a plain-
tiff’s particular harm, would unnecessarily ‘stymie novel legal 
challenges and robust debate’ arising in different judicial dis-
tricts.”276 
More important than percolation in the tens of thousands of 
lawsuits before the federal courts is the courts’ overarching 
goal—to provide prompt and complete relief for wronged plain-
tiffs and to check lawbreaking and excesses. As Professor 
 
 273. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 274. In 2018, the United States Supreme Court decided seventy-five lawsuits. 
Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2019 Supreme Court Database, SUP. CT. DATABASE, 
supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc
/H4D5-BFXJ]. In the year ending March 31, 2018, 358,563 lawsuits were filed in 
United States district courts, 50,970 appeals were filed in the United States courts 
of appeal. Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/Q82R-MAZL]. 
 275.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 276. Id. (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244 
(9th Cir. 2018)). 
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Suzette Malveaux noted, “there are occasions when an issue is 
sufficiently ripe and particularly pressing such that it should be 
ruled on sooner rather than later.”277 Judge Gregg Costa added, 
“for challenges to policies that are plainly unlawful, the rule of 
law would favor speedy and uniform judicial action.”278 If the 
issues are clearly drawn, judicial economy militates against mul-
tiple lawsuits and delayed relief. These points are particularly 
appropriate when a judge finds that a defendant’s impairment 
of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights has created irreparable in-
jury that warrants an injunction. 
The parties’ complaints and briefs and the judges’ decisions 
that I read to prepare this Article are uniformly well argued on 
both sides. Many were brought by state attorneys general, oth-
ers by specialty organizations, often supported by national law 
firms. The federal government’s lawyers are good at defending 
lawsuits. These well-developed lawsuits answer the need for 
thorough prior consideration of the issues found in national gov-
ernment injunction cases and negate the argument for 
percolation. 
Finally, the federal government itself argues for haste that 
prevents percolation. The federal government’s vertical forum 
shopping militates against percolation. As just one example, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court’s preliminary injunction 
blocking the federal government’s rollback of the Deferred Ac-
tion for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.279 The govern-
ment sought mandamus in the Ninth Circuit and certiorari 
before the Supreme Court at the discovery stage.280 The Depart-
ment of Justice sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit imposing a 
deadline on a ruling and threatening to leapfrog the court of ap-
peals and seek Supreme Court review.281 
Fostering percolation is not a policy that is persuasive 
enough to override a judge’s ability to grant a nationwide na-
 
 277. Malveaux, supra note 14, at 58.  
 278. Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. 
L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-
the-nationwide-injunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/SVL3-CPTP]. 
 279. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 280. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (2018). 
 281. Adam Liptak, Trump Asks Supreme Court for Fast Appeal for Transgender 
Military Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/us
/politics/trump-transgender-ban-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/SX2X-
9828]. 
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tional government injunction when circumstances otherwise 
warrant that relief. 
F. Precedent 
The critics of national government injunctions additionally 
argue that a federal district judge’s decision lacks force as bind-
ing precedent. But a district judge’s national government 
injunction has force all over the United States. Similarly, a court 
of appeals decision lacks force as binding precedent in the other 
federal circuits. But once more, a district judge’s national gov-
ernment injunction has force all over the United States.282 
The critics’ precedent argument is based on the idea that the 
government wrongdoer ought to be able to ignore the apparent 
law announced by a distinct or appellate court with power to de-
cide. Rule of law principles that support obedience militate 
against this precedent argument. Moreover, the critics’ argu-
ment regarding formal hierarchal rules of binding precedent is 
weak in practice. It underestimates the persuasive precedential 
effect that federal district courts’ decisions have for other judges, 
and it downgrades the persuasive force of thoughtful district 
court opinions. Two examples follow from the national govern-
ment injunction decisions examined in this Article. 
First, the judge in Damus v. Nielsen wrote that “[t]his Court 
agrees with the sound reasoning of Judge Wolford of the West-
ern District of New York.”283 The judge also noted that the 
contention at issue in the case “was carefully explained in a re-
cent opinion from the Southern District of California . . . .”284 
Second, in City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, where national gov-
ernment injunction opponents argued that district court 
decisions are not entitled to binding precedent status, the judge 
replied that “[t]he most factually apposite cases regarding per-
manent injunctions against enforcement grant conditions are 
other district court opinions regarding recent attempts to impose 
immigration enforcement priorities on localities.”285 
 
 282. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 283. 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 284.  Id. 
 285. 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 339 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
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When the law is developing rapidly in trial courts and there 
is very little appellate law on the issue, trial judges will (and 
should) consult their colleagues who are parallel in the judicial 
hierarchy.286 Although a federal court of appeals decision is not 
formally binding precedent in other federal circuits, other fed-
eral circuits will regard it as persuasive precedent, particularly 
if binding precedent is lacking. 
G. Asymmetry 
Asymmetry is a technical variation of critics’ other, party-
based arguments against the national government injunc-
tion.287 If a plaintiff sues the United States and loses, another 
plaintiff can still sue the United States. But the reverse is not 
true: if the United States loses in the plaintiff’s first lawsuit and 
the judge grants a nationwide national government injunction, 
then that ends the disputed issue for the United States. The fed-
eral government obeys the injunction without being able to 
relitigate the issue in a second lawsuit. 
The critics add that a plaintiff injunction class cures this 
asymmetry because preclusion bars members of the plaintiff 
class from suing again if the United States wins.288 But the gov-
ernment is free from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion; if the 
federal government sues and loses, a second plaintiff cannot take 
advantage of the first judgment to preclude the government from 
relitigating the merits.289 Critics say that a national govern-
ment injunction is inconsistent because the government has no 
opportunity to relitigate after the judge grants it. 
The critics’ asymmetry argument dilutes the force of an in-
junction. Also, preclusion and injunctions are different and par-
allel bodies of law. Preclusion rules do not outrank injunction 
rules. Quite the reverse. Violation of an injunction can lead to 
the judge punishing a nonparty for criminal contempt. The rules 
of who must obey an injunction should be narrower than the pre-
clusion rules which lead to only litigative constraint by barring 
 
 286. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 262. 
 287. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 288. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 289. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
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relitigation. Preclusion may bind a litigant who should be be-
yond the reach of contempt.290 
H. Nonparty Benefit 
One of critics’ major arguments against nationwide national 
government injunctions is that they benefit nonparties.291 Even 
Professor Amanda Frost—who argues that a nationwide injunc-
tion ought to be a remedial option for a federal court—used 
nonparty benefit to define nationwide injunctions. A nationwide 
injunction, she says, is an interlocutory or permanent injunction 
that a federal judge grants when that injunction benefits non-
parties but is not a plaintiff injunction class action.292 
Some injunctions do not affect anyone but the parties. For a 
hypothetical example, Tom Trespass trespasses on Owen 
Owner’s land to fish in Owen’s creek. The judge grants Owen an 
injunction that forbids Tom from trespassing. Only Tom and 
Owen are affected by this injunction. 
Most injunctions, however, have direct and indirect effects. 
Many injunctions directly benefit nonparties. For example, a 
single plaintiff’s injunction against a defendant for feedlot air 
pollution directly affects and benefits everyone formerly within 
range of the abated pollution.293 Whether or not a plaintiff rep-
resents a class, ending the harm for one may benefit many: when 
a single plaintiff persuades a court to abate a defendant’s foul 
feedlot, all of the neighbors breathe fresher air.294 
“Benefit” is too narrow because it overlooks injunctions’ neg-
ative effect on nonparties. An injunction against implementation 
of the Affordable Care Act would disadvantage millions of people 
who would lose medical insurance coverage.295 An injunction 
 
 290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (AM. LAW. INST. 1982). “Bind” 
is ambiguous even when used to refer to those who should obey an injunction 
because it creates confusion about who must obey an injunction, precedent, and 
preclusion. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 876–77. Taking “bound” out of these 
categories—to mean that a nonparty who “benefits” from an injunction is “bound” 
by it—takes the word beyond any sensible meaning. 
 291. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
 292. Frost, supra note 9, at 1071. 
 293. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158 n.17. 
 294. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 506; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158 
n.16. 
 295. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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striking down expanded eligibility for overtime under the mini-
mum wage statute means that employees formerly entitled to 
overtime pay would not earn more in the future for those eligible 
hours, although their employers would benefit because they 
would pay regular cost for overtime hours. 
Effect on nonparties can be seen in multiple types of litiga-
tion. For example, busing decrees in school desegregation 
lawsuits affected nonparties, in particular nonparty students 
who were transported to distant schools. In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court admitted to the ef-
fect on nonparties: “The remedy for such segregation may be 
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in 
some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awk-
wardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided . . . .”296 
Although court-ordered transportation triggered widespread 
and serious nonparty opposition, judges continued to use busing 
decrees to desegregate schools.297  
Similarly, if the court finds legislative districts unconstitu-
tional and redraws the districts, the new districts will affect 
territory outside the formerly unconstitutional districts as well 
as voters in both the old and new districts. Many of these voters 
were probably satisfied with the old districts. 
Nationwide injunctions create indirect and ripple benefits. 
For example, a comprehensive structural injunction that brings 
a prison into compliance with the Constitution creates an indi-
rect ripple effect on the nonparty taxpayers’ tax bills.298 “[A] 
court order directing a local government body to levy its own 
taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal 
court”299 that raises nonparties’ tax bills. Similarly, a plaintiff’s 
lawsuit that ends with a declaratory judgment that the defend-
ant’s patent is invalid and an injunction forbidding the 
 
 296. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). 
 297. KRUSE & ZELIZER, supra note 45, at 58–61; Nikole Hanna-Jones, News 
Analysis, It Was Never About Busing: Court-Ordered Desegregation Worked. But 
White Racism Made It Hard to Accept., N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/sunday/it-was-never-about-busing.html 
[https://perma.cc/BR3L-EJCF]; Laura Meckler, Effective But Never Popular, Court-




 298. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). 
 299. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990). 
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defendant from enforcing it should encourage competition that 
lowers prices and indirectly benefits nonparty buyers. 
Professor Chayes wrote that relief in public law structural 
litigation, usually an injunction, is not “confined in its impact to 
the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned 
ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having im-
portant consequences for many persons including absentees.”300 
Class action scholars have identified nonparty benefits from in-
junction classes.301 
In national government injunction litigation about the re-
scission of DACA, the Ninth Circuit responded to the govern-
ment’s request to narrow an injunction affecting nonparties by 
noting that “[t]here is no general requirement that an injunction 
affect only the parties in the suit.”302 The court went on to state 
that “[a]n injunction is not necessarily made over-broad by ex-
tending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing 
parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such 
breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which 
they are entitled.”303 
The nationwide injunction’s critics base their view that in-
junctions benefitting nonparties are illegitimate on what they 
argue is the order’s recent origins.304 Professor Frost’s justifica-
tion for national injunctions considers history and the idea of 
nonparty benefit. She observes that “the existence of the bill of 
peace, and the absence of a clear prohibition against injunctions 
affecting nonparties, suggests that there is a credible argument 
 
 300. Chayes, supra note 239, at 1302. 
 301. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of 
Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 (2002); Richard A. Nagareda, 
The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 149, 180 (2003); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal 
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 398 (2003). 
 302. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511 
(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 303. Id. at 511 (quoting Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170–71) (emphasis omitted); see 
also Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(granting injunction that benefitted nonparties where “the breadth of the injunction 
was necessary” to provide relief for plaintiffs); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200, 1207 
(10th Cir. 1973) (stating that the judge may draft an injunction that “benefits” 
nonparties); AFGE v. Cavasos, 721 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub. nom. AFGE v. Sanders, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(granting injunction because agency regulations that violate the constitution vacate 
the rules for all persons, instead of merely preventing the agency from applying the 
regulations to complainants); Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158. 
 304. Bray, supra note 11; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
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that national government injunctions are not a sharp break with 
pre-1789 practice. . . .”305 She also says that “the historical prac-
tice supports the conclusion that courts have always had the 
authority to issue equitable relief that encompasses nonpar-
ties.”306 Frost’s points are correct. The bill of peace was a joinder 
device that allowed a decision to affect nonparties.307 The nine-
teenth century Supreme Court seems to have agreed that the 
Chancery could resolve the whole dispute to prevent a “multi-
plicity” of actions at law: 
Under the principles which in the federal system distinguish 
cases in law from those in equity, the circuit court of the 
United States, sitting in equity, can make a comprehensive 
decree covering the whole ground of controversy, and thus 
avoid the multiplicity of suits that would inevitably arise un-
der the statute.308 
A class action rule was not developed until 1938 and was not 
effective until amendments in 1966. After the class action rule 
was amended in 1966 to make it functional and more workable, 
Professor Kaplan wrote for the advisory committee that “[w]hen 
numerous persons stood in the same position toward an adver-
sary so that there was potentially a large number of essentially 
identical lawsuits, equity might in effect allow a consolidation of 
the expected actions and clear up the entire situation through a 
bill of peace.”309 Because of the modern class action rule, the bill 
of peace is obsolete. 
 Professor James Pfander’s article with Jacob Wentzel and 
Professor Mila Sohoni’s separate article have applied scrupulous 
research to refute the national government injunction’s critics’ 
arguments that the “traditional” view was that an injunction 
“benefitted” only the party plaintiff and that the national gov-
ernment injunction is a recent innovation.310 These scholars 
 
 305.  Frost, supra note 9, at 1081 n.77. 
 306. Id. at 1081. 
 307. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee 
the City of Chicago, supra note 105, at 8; CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 166. 
 308. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 517 (1898), aff’d as modified, 171 U.S. 361 
(1898). 
 309. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 
(1967). 
 310. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 10–11); Sohoni, supra 
note 105; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and 
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found that broad, nonparty injunctions were used much earlier 
in state and federal courts against both state and federal gov-
ernments. The government defendants in those cases were 
primarily concerned about the substantive merits, not the 
breadth, of injunctions. If a court held a statute or executive 
measure unconstitutional, it was not enforced at all.311 The ex-
ecutive branch’s defense—trying to circumscribe the court’s na-
tional government injunction against the executive’s illegal 
measure—is the innovation here, not the broad injunction 
against it. 
The critics’ argument that a nonparty benefits from a na-
tional government injunction is overstated. If a defendant 
violates an injunction, a nonparty lacks the legal ability to en-
force it; only the plaintiff or the judge can enforce the injunction 
with civil or criminal contempt.312 A nonparty suffering under a 
defendant’s illegal post-injunction policy has two alternatives. 
First, she can intervene in the original lawsuit.313 Second, she 
can file a new lawsuit, cite the first judge’s decision as precedent, 
and demand an injunction of her own. The new plaintiff may ad-
duce the previous decision as precedent but she cannot, under 
present law, use the preclusion doctrines to prevent the govern-
ment from relitigating.314 
 
Appellee the City of Chicago, supra note 105, at 15–18; Trammell, supra note 156, 
at 989; Portia Pedro, Toward Establishing a Pre-extinction Definition of 
“Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847, 873 (2020) (adding “that Bray’s 
historical arguments about equity are not as ironclad as they might first seem to 
be”).  
 311. Sohoni, supra note 105, at 977. 
 312. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th 
Cir. 1979); Secor v. Singleton, 35 F. 376, 378 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1888); RENDLEMAN, 
supra note 146, at 506; Rendleman, supra note 50. 
 313. FED. R. CIV. P. 24; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 159 nn.21–23; Amanda 
Bronstad, Duke Pays $54.5M to Settle ‘No Poach’ Class Action After DOJ Intervenes, 
LAW.COM (May 20, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.law.com/2019/05/20/duke-pays-54-
5m-to-settle-no-poach-class-action-after-doj-intervenes/ [https://perma.cc/ZUN7-
FQCY]. 
 314. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); Clopton, supra note 11. 
Professor Clopton argues persuasively that Mendoza is incorrect. He argues that 
the United States is a skilled litigant that does not need to be protected from 
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Indeed, Justice Gorsuch wrote that the 
federal government is the most powerful of parties. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 
2400, 2425 (2019). Clopton’s solution to the national government injunction is that 
a judge may grant an injunction broad enough to protect those nonparties who 
would be likely candidates for nonmutual preclusion. The judge, he adds, ought to 
decline to issue a national government injunction when nonparties would be 
unlikely candidates for nonmutual or nonparty preclusion. But the judge should be 
skeptical of any wait-and-see plaintiffs and exercise caution when there are 
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The way a nonparty benefits is that the government defend-
ant ceases its improper behavior and obeys the plaintiff’s injunc-
tion. Rule of law principles, the rule that requires agents to obey 
an injunction against their principal,315 and the traditional doc-
trine of in personam jurisdiction support the government’s obe-
dience to the apparent law. By calling it a “nationwide 
injunction,” critics mean that the injunction affects everyone in 
the United States because that is where the U.S. government 
and its agents are. The critics have not developed the related 
“who-must-obey” issue. Critics argue that nonparty benefits go 
too far.316 They chastise nonparty benefits based on the unspo-
ken idea that the government will comply. 
The supposed beneficiaries of the national government in-
junction—not the defendant or the injunction’s geographic 
coverage—create the conditions that critics oppose. Focusing on 
nonparties directs attention to the public and away from the de-
fendant (whom the court has ordered to obey). Emphasis on 
nonparty benefits downgrades or ignores judicial review, sepa-
ration of powers, and the basic equitable principles of in 
personam jurisdiction and agents’ obedience to injunctions. The 
critics also ignore the informal understanding that the govern-
ment complies with injunctions and ignore the court’s role, 
which is to extend complete relief to victims and to suppress law-
breaking. This distraction may erode relief for those harmed by 
the defendants’ illegal conduct. 
My view is that when a federal judge drafts relief after the 
federal executive has broken the law, the identity of the federal 
executive defendant and the compliance of its agents are more 
important than how the injunction affects nonparties. Focusing 
on nonparties distracts from the more important issue of how a 
court orders the federal executive to obey the law to assure that 
people retain their constitutional and statutory rights as well as 
to end the government’s illegal conduct. The critics’ nonparty ar-
gument ought to remind litigants and other observers to 
 
inconsistent prior judgments. Overruling Mendoza to allow nonparty preclusion 
against the United States will, Clopton argues, reduce the need for national 
government injunctions because second lawsuits against the United States will 
then be streamlined. Id. 
 315. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2). 
 316. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; 
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, 
supra note 12. 
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consider an injunction’s positive and negative effects on 
nonparties. 
Critics concede that a national government injunction is not 
inappropriate when the plaintiffs sue on behalf of an injunction 
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).317 The rea-
soning is that the judge’s certification of the plaintiff injunction 
class will slow the litigation down, check loose procedure, and 
protect nonparties. 
Accepting a nationwide injunction class is a necessary con-
cession. In litigation about the recapture of benefits overpay-
ments in 1979, the Supreme Court in Califano v. Yamasaki ap-
proved a nationwide plaintiff injunction class, noting that “class 
relief is appropriate in civil actions brought in federal court, in-
cluding those seeking to overturn determinations of the 
departments of the Executive Branch of the Government in 
cases where judicial review of such determinations is author-
ized.”318 
The Court’s reasoning was based on the plaintiffs’ need for 
complete relief: 
Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of eq-
uity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dic-
tated by the extent of the violation established, not by the 
geographical extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is 
otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the claims of 
the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide 
in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief afforded the 
plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary to redress 
the complaining parties.319 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that an in-
junction in favor of a nationwide plaintiff class prevented the 
development of issues through percolation in several lower 
courts: “[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide 
class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed 
appropriate in the case before it, and that certification of such a 
class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of simi-
lar issues in other judicial districts.”320 
 
 317. See Bray, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616. 
 318. 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979). 
 319. Id. at 702 (citation omitted). 
 320. Id. 
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The availability of a national government injunction when 
the plaintiff sues on behalf of an injunction class shows that the 
critics’ argument against the national government injunction is 
based on equity jurisdiction, not on subject matter jurisdiction. 
A judge, who has authority and power to grant a national gov-
ernment injunction in closely related class action litigation, has 
authority and power to grant a nationwide national government 
injunction in nonclass litigation. 
A plaintiff injunction class differs from the better-known 
plaintiff damages class. An injunction class member receives no 
notice of the ongoing litigation and has no right to exit the class 
by opting out. A damages class member receives notice and an 
opportunity to opt out. Authorities maintain that in both types 
of class action, a winning defendant earns preclusion. In other 
words, the authorities assume that if the defendant wins on the 
merits, an absentee injunction class member will be precluded 
from suing the defendant on the same cause of action. Injunction 
class members remain unbeknownst in the class. They have nei-
ther ability to control it nor any day in court.321 
Binding a class member who received neither notice nor an 
opportunity to exit seems unfair. But courts have not developed 
the preclusion rule because the injunction class litigation has 
taken another route. It has evolved through class certification, 
negotiated consent decrees, and motions to modify or dissolve. 
The injunction class’s development has not followed the scenario 
of litigation to a substantive decision—defendant victories on 
the substantive law—followed by second suits by injunction 
class members.322 The injunction class, which ignores differ-
ences within plaintiff injunction classes, “veers toward 
unconstitutional territory.”323  
Professor Fiss observed that the plaintiff injunction class is 
not the foundation of the structural injunction because of the 
“group character of the underlying substantive claim.”324 An ab-
 
 321. Marcus, supra note 188, at 658. Professor Marcus speculates that there is 
“no trans-substantive explanation for why injunctive relief class members lack 
notice and opt-out rights, [the drafting committee] undoubtedly believed that the 
substantive consequences of class treatment justified res judicata, and they 
understood that interest representation provided the constitutional footing for this 
preclusive effect.” Id. at 716. 
 322. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 527; John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The 
Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1446–50 (2003). 
 323. Marcus, supra note 188, at 703, 711. 
 324. FISS, supra note 170, at 15. 
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sent injunction class member who received no notice may be as 
disassociated from the litigation as a nonparty. Nevertheless, 
the class-based remedy may affect nonparties: “Whether plain-
tiff proceeds as an individual or on a class-suit basis, the re-
quested relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all 
other persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack.”325 
An injunction class action does not differ much from other civil 
rights litigation. Nonparty status and absent class membership 
work out to be about the same.326 
Historically, defendants who have opposed Rule 23(b)(2) 
certification have not succeeded.327 The unqualified point in an 
earlier edition of the popular Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice 
and Procedure treatise was that Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites are 
liberally applied in certifying (b)(2) discrimination classes that 
involve civil and constitutional rights.328 The 2018 edition qual-
ified the liberal application in employment discrimination cases 
where the plaintiffs asked for an injunction class and also sought 
to recover money for lost income.329 
It remains to be seen how the narrowed certification of in-
junction classes in employment discrimination cases affects 
national government injunction classes not also seeking money 
damages. Professor Malveaux is not optimistic: “Aggregate liti-
gation is being undermined at the very same time Bray is sug-
gesting greater dependence on it [for nationwide national gov-
ernment injunctions]. But the government cannot have it both 
ways. As the availability of the class action device goes down, 
the need for the national injunction goes up.”330 My own view is 
less pessimistic than Malveaux’s: the structural injunction, 
which is entrenched and routine, will not change much. 
Moreover, the critics’ argument that the injunction class 
certification process will prevent improvident remedies and pro-
 
 325. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 245, §§ 1771, 2903. 
 326. Marcus, supra note 188, at 703, 716. 
 327. DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2010); Shook v. 
El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004); Marcus, supra note 188, at 706. 
 328. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1771, at 663 (1972) (commenting on the “liberalized application of 
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites” in Rule 23(b)(2) cases). 
 329. Id. (narrowed by Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) and 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 564 U.S. 338 (2011)); see also id. § 2903. 
 330. Malveaux, supra note 14, at 60. 
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tect nonparties seems to me and to Professor Frost to be 
overstated.331 
There are some differences between an injunction class rem-
edy and an injunction without a plaintiff class. The most im-
portant difference is that a class member can raise contempt 
charges, but a nonparty cannot.332 Additionally, a class of plain-
tiffs makes the case more difficult to moot.333 Neither of these 
differences have played much of a practical role in actual 
litigation. 
An injunction class is a good idea and is not exceptionally 
burdensome. Should a nationwide injunction class be a prereq-
uisite for a nationwide national government injunction? In 
short, no. The executive may change government policy quickly 
and improperly in a way that affects dispersed, and possibly 
transitory, people. A lawsuit for a national government injunc-
tion is complex and specialized litigation that requires prompt 
preparation by specialized plaintiffs’ lawyers with depth and re-
sources. The victims of the improper policy may lack the ability 
to sue individually. State attorneys general and activist mem-
bership organizations should be able to sue the wrongdoers for 
quick relief to protect nonparties from irreparable injury. Seek-
ing a plaintiff injunction class is a salutary but not an indispen-
sable tactic. The judge might, however, certify a provisional in-
junction class before granting plaintiffs interlocutory relief.334 
I. Single Judge 
The critics’ final argument is that the national government 
injunction violates separation of powers principles because a sin-
gle judge can stop a national executive program.335 A nationwide 
national government injunction, they argue, gives too much 
power to the judiciary at the expense of the executive. 
 
 331. Frost, supra note 9, at 1071 (writing that national government injunctions 
do not require class action certification protections for nonparties). 
 332. Marcus, supra note 188, at 701 n.253; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 159 
nn.21–23. 
 333. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992); Rendleman, 
supra note 50, at 159 n.24. 
 334. See, e.g., Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 335 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 335. See Bray, supra note 11, at 420; Cass, supra note 11, at 1; Morley, supra 
note 11, at 620; Wasserman, supra note 10, at 339; Sessions Memorandum on 
Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12. 
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The critics’ argument is contrary to core ideas of constitu-
tional law and separation of powers. The judiciary has the final 
word on what the Constitution means, and it uses judicial review 
to exercise that final say. Justice Brandeis wrote: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the 
convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude 
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid 
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to 
the distribution of the governmental powers among three de-
partments, to save the people from autocracy.336 
The federal courts keep the federal executive in constitu-
tional line.337 In a system without the nationwide national gov-
ernment injunction, the federal executive could develop and im-
plement policies and programs that avoid obeying the law. 
In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Justice Scalia 
wrote: 
It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts 
may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against 
state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal 
law. But that has been true not only with respect to violations 
of federal law by state officials, but also with respect to viola-
tions of federal law by federal officials. . . . What our cases 
demonstrate is that, “in a proper case, relief may be given in 
a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public 
officer.” 
 The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by 
state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity 
and reflects the long history of judicial review of illegal exec-
utive action, tracing back to England.338 
In short, under equitable jurisdiction and established prec-
edent, a plaintiff may sue federal officials in federal court to en-
 
 336. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 337. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
 338. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (quoting 
Carroll v. Safford, 44 U.S. 441, 463 (1845)) (citations omitted) (rejecting an 
injunction in the absence of a private right of action). 
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join their unconstitutional actions.339 The federal court may de-
termine whether the President “has acted within the law.”340 
The critics take a narrow and anachronistic view of the role 
of courts and litigation. It is narrow because the judiciary has 
always had the backup role, first articulated by Chief Justice 
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, “to say what the law 
is.”341 It is anachronistic because it neglects the rise of divided 
government, a too-activist executive, group litigation, and the 
injunction as a remedial tool to enforce statutory and constitu-
tional rights. 
The United States lacks a constitutional court to suppress 
outlier government decisions, as is found in other nations’ con-
stitutions.342 This work falls on the trial judges in the U.S. 
district courts as “regular” litigation with the usual appellate 
processes in the courts of appeals and Supreme Court.343 The 
use of three-judge district courts to determine whether statutes 
are unconstitutional has faded into the sunset.344 One way for 
Congress to overcome the single-judge and forum-shopping is-
sues is to pass a new three-judge district court statute. 
Professor Jeffery Rosen closes his short biography of Presi-
dent Taft by reminding us that “[a]s independent judges repre-
sent the last check on unconstitutional encroachments by the 
president, Congress and the states, conservatives, classical lib-
erals, and progressives alike are converging around a renewed 
appreciation for judicial independence.”345 
Like grading exams for a professor, correcting Congress and 
the President may not be the best part of a federal judge’s work-
load. Yet, it is vital. The better approach, as a federal judge, is 
to grit your teeth and do your job.346 
 
 339. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
491 n.2 (2010); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). 
 340. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 731, 753–54 (1982). 
 341. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 342. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL art. 102–03 (Braz.); GRUNDGESETZ 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 92–94 (Ger.). 
 343. WOOD, supra note 19, at 448. 
 344. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 1). 
 345. JEFFREY ROSEN, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 137 (2018); see also Burbank, 
supra note 74, at 22. 
 346. UROFSKY, supra note 39, at 30 (“In any case involving the president or 
Congress, the Court nearly always repeats the mantra that deference is due to the 
judgments of the coordinate branches of government. Despite that, the Court has 
no problem telling the president that he cannot do certain things.”). 
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V. FILTERS AND PRINCIPLES OF CONFINEMENT 
This Article now turns to whether plaintiffs are qualified for 
an injunction after prevailing on the merits and, if they are qual-
ified, how to draft the injunction’s breadth, size, and shape. The 
judge’s equitable discretion to shape the injunction exceeds his 
discretion to choose the remedy. 
National government injunctions enforce the Constitution 
and federal statutes. They provide complete relief for plaintiffs 
and protect thousands of victims who may be unable to protect 
themselves. They avoid piecemeal, duplicative litigation, pro-
mote national uniformity, and obviate the administrative diffi-
culties that arise when improper government activity is allowed. 
Complete relief places the plaintiff where the defendant’s 
obedience would have, as nearly as a court order can. Through 
an injunction, the judge stops the defendant from impinging on 
the plaintiff’s ability to exercise a constitutional or statutory 
right. The defendant’s side of the coin is that “injunctive relief 
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary 
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”347 
Sometimes a group remedy based on interest representation 
is the only practical solution. An example comes from imple-
menting Brown v. Board of Education.348 Earlier decisions 
granted plaintiffs individual freedom-of-choice injunctions by 
admitting only the named plaintiffs to formerly segregated 
schools. Desegregation was making only incremental progress 
until plaintiffs started seeking injunction class relief: “Individ-
ual black students choosing one-by-one to attend white schools, 
however, would never disassemble the segregation edifice.”349 
“A student-by-student approach to desegregation litigation 
posed enormous difficulties and all but nullified Brown. To those 
invested in the success of litigation-driven desegregation, class 
treatment of claims seemed essential.”350 
A federal court does not casually void executive branch ac-
tivity or an act of Congress. Federal judges are deferential to 
their parallel elected branches. A judge ought to be wary of over-
turning the decision of an elected branch of government on an 
 
 347. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). 
 348.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 349.  Marcus, supra note 188, at 688. 
 350. Id. at 680–81; see also Rendleman, supra note 179, at 1587–93. 
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important issue.351 Commentators have noted that “the justices 
traditionally are solicitous when a president raises questions 
concerning the separation of powers.”352 Professor Frost adds:  
A single district court judge should not lightly assert control 
over federal policy for the nation, or take action that would 
prevent her fellow judges from reaching their own decisions 
in cases involving different plaintiffs. But when the benefits 
outweigh the costs, the courts should have this tool at 
hand.353 
To accept that a judge may grant a nationwide national gov-
ernment injunction that forbids the federal executive’s 
overreach does not mean that a court will grant a nationwide 
injunction for all federal executive breaches. One question is 
whether another order will implement a proper remedy and com-
plete justice, including the suppression of official wrongdoing. A 
second question is how a nationwide injunction will affect third 
persons not connected with the lawsuit. Context and implemen-
tation details matter. These considerations are part of the 
judge’s equitable discretion in choosing and tailoring a remedy. 
Other possible or actual constraints on the national govern-
ment injunction are: class certification; the permanent and 
preliminary injunction standards, including balancing the hard-
ships, the likelihood of success on the merits, the public interest, 
the effect on third persons, and plaintiffs’ evidence of loss; the 
judge’s role in drafting the order; motions to modify or dissolve; 
and prompt appellate review. Other procedural techniques that 
broaden participation on the plaintiff side are intervention as a 
party to express supporting claims354 and nonparty’ participa-
tion as amici to provide support and differing perspectives. 
Once a plaintiff’s complaint surmounts the hurdle of the de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss, the next procedural stage is discov-
 
 351. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381–82 (2004) 
(recognizing deference to the executive in deciding whether to entertain 
mandamus). 
 352. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Take up Trump’s Broad Claims of 




 353. Frost, supra note 9, at 1116. 
 354. FED. R. CIV. P. 24; Bronstad, supra note 313. 
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ery. The government’s procedural efforts to avoid submitting to 
discovery are another procedural chapter.355 
A. An Injunction Class Action 
A national government injunction plaintiff is advised to seek 
an injunction class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2). The checklist for the judge’s certification of an injunc-
tion class has four requirements in Rule 23(a) and one in Rule 
23(b)(2). The Rule 23(a) requirements are: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.356 
If possible, plaintiffs seeking nationwide injunctions should 
define and state a nationwide Rule 23(a) plaintiff class with: 
enough class members, a named plaintiff who has a claim typical 
of class members’ claims, common questions of law and fact, the 
same injury, capable lawyers, and no internal class conflict. Rule 
23(b)(2) requires the defendant’s misconduct to apply generally 
to the plaintiff class and be curable with an injunction or declar-
atory judgment and acknowledges that separate actions risk 
inconsistency.357 From my reading of complaints and decisions 
for this Article, the plaintiffs’ adequacy of representation has 
been assured. 
B. Prerequisites for a Permanent Injunction 
The prerequisites for a permanent injunction and a prelim-
inary injunction are additional hurdles for a national 
 
 355. Vladeck, supra note 91. 
 356.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
 357. See, e.g., Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 334–35 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(provisional class certified). 
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government injunction plaintiff. In eBay v. MercExchange, the 
Supreme Court said that a plaintiff seeking a final or permanent 
injunction must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that reme-
dies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public inter-
est would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.358 
Plaintiffs’ adequate remedy at law—damages—has not yet 
come up in national government injunction litigation. The court 
assumes plaintiffs’ irreparable injury from the defendant’s con-
stitutional violation.359 Balancing the hardships compares the 
plaintiffs’ benefit from an injunction with defendant’s burden 
from it. Either balancing the hardships or considering the public 
interest can lead the court to examine an injunction’s third-party 
effects.360 A hypothetical example of third-party effects that 
would militate against a national government injunction would 
occur in an Affordable Care Act lawsuit where an injunction 
holding the program unconstitutional could lead to twenty mil-
lion people losing health insurance.361 Possible substitutes for 
 
 358. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 359. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability 
Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren 
Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1380–88 
(2002). 
 360. For example, the New York State Court of Appeals’ well-known decision in 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970), was a private 
nuisance lawsuit brought because of the defendant’s particulate pollution. In 
approving permanent damages instead of an injunction, the court mentioned both 
the defendant’s investment in its plant and the number of its employees. Balancing 
the hardships would involve comparing the defendant’s hardships from an 
injunction to the plaintiff’s hardships without an injunction, a comparison that 
apparently considered the defendant’s investment and ultimately favored the 
cement plant. The company’s employees were nonparties who would be adversely 
affected if the plant were shuttered, another factor that apparently militated 
against an injunction. The majority did not, however, mention another nonparty 
effect: the particulate pollution’s effect on public health. Id. 
 361. In the actual lawsuit, the trial judge granted a declaratory judgment 
stating that the program was unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed that 
the program violated the constitution but remanded for the trial judge to reconsider 
severability. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019). As of late 2019, 
the court is probably a year from determining a remedy. 
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an injunction include a declaratory judgment, a delayed injunc-
tion, and a stay. 
C. Prerequisites for an Interlocutory Injunction 
The federal rules permit two forms of interlocutory injunc-
tion: the temporary restraining order and the preliminary 
injunction.362 The judge may grant the plaintiff a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) without notice to the defendant. The 
federal government is everywhere in the United States: it is 
available for formal notice, meaning at least notice by email, fax, 
or telephone.363 The reading for this Article did not reveal any 
ex parte orders against the United States. I cannot think of an 
emergency that clamors for such immediate attention that the 
judge should grant the plaintiff an ex parte TRO against the 
ubiquitous United States without any notice at all. 
Before granting a final injunction, a judge must determine 
that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. And that judge de-
cides the interlocutory preliminary injunction before the parties 
have developed a full record: 
 The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to pre-
serve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the 
merits can be held. Given this limited purpose and given the 
haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be pre-
served, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on 
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that 
is less complete than in a trial on the merits.364 
The standard for a preliminary injunction includes the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of success. A preliminary injunction plain-
tiff must demonstrate: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) 
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm without preliminary re-
lief, (3) the balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor, and (4) a 
preliminary injunction will be in the public interest.365 
Determining the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the mer-
its sometimes revolves around whether to apply a sliding scale. 
The classic statement of the sliding scale test is: 
 
 362. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
 363. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i). 
 364. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
 365. Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
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[T]hat a preliminary injunction should issue only upon a 
clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and 
possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious ques-
tions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for 
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly to-
ward the party requesting the preliminary relief.366 
Under the test’s second prong, the judge may grant the 
plaintiff a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows “a 
fair ground for litigation.” I respectfully submit that, before en-
joining the federal executive, a judge should find that the 
plaintiff has more than a 50 percent chance of prevailing. The 
judge should put the “fair ground of litigation” question to one 
side for a national government preliminary injunction. 
The federal rule tells the judge to grant a plaintiff an inter-
locutory order, a TRO, or a preliminary injunction only after the 
plaintiff posts an injunction bond to indemnify the defendant if 
the interlocutory order turns out, on plenary hearing, to have 
been incorrect.367 Injunction bonds are discretionary in national 
government injunction lawsuits. The decisions usually do not 
mention them, although one court discussed and then waived 
the bond.368 Waiving the bond is the better approach. 
Another possible technique is for the judge to combine the 
preliminary injunction and final injunction hearings, in effect 
leapfrogging the preliminary injunction.369 The judge will then 
decide whether to grant the plaintiff a final injunction. 
The judge who is deciding an interlocutory injunction will 
make a written ruling on fact and law, stating reasons and 
terms.370 Stating the reasoning prompts the trial judge to think 
through the issues and helps the appellate court understand the 
lower court’s decision. 
 
 366. Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 
1973) (emphasis omitted). 
 367. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
 368. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018); 
see also Pedro, supra note 310, at 873 (“Bray’s historical arguments about equity 
are not as ironclad as they might first seem to be.”). 
 369. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495 (2003). 
 370. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1)(2), 65(d)(1). 
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D. Proof and Findings 
The adversarial hearing for a preliminary or final national 
government injunction will be based on briefing and will include 
declarations or affidavits, oral evidence if needed, and argu-
ment. The judge will base the injunction on the evidence. The 
plaintiff should adduce nationwide evidence to support a nation-
wide order. Frost wrote, “The best practice is for a federal dis-
trict court to establish procedures to ensure that it has all the 
relevant information about the costs and benefits of the proposed 
scope of an injunction before issuing it.”371 
The plaintiff’s proof is crucial. In August 2019, the Ninth 
Circuit decided against the government’s motion to stay a na-
tionwide preliminary injunction.372 It said that the government 
had not shown that it was likely to prevail on the merits. The 
Ninth Circuit refused to stay the entire preliminary injunction, 
instead staying the injunction only as it applied to states outside 
the circuit, explaining that “the nationwide scope of the injunc-
tion is not supported by the record as it stands.”373 
Also, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
must lay the foundation for nationwide relief. In the decision on 
the stay described in the prior paragraph, the Ninth Circuit 
added that the trial judge had “failed to discuss whether a na-
tionwide injunction is necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged 
harm.”374 In addition to staying the trial judge’s nationwide in-
junction outside of the Ninth Circuit, the court sent the 
nationwide feature back to the trial judge for proof and findings 
of plaintiffs’ nationwide harm.375 
“Sanctuary city” litigation is another example of the need 
for nationwide proof. Local police sometimes decline to imple-
ment federal executive orders that facilitate enforcement of 
federal immigration policies. These localities are called “sanctu-
ary cities.” But the “sanctuary city” is a diverse, nonuniform 
 
 371. Frost, supra note 9, at 1116. 
 372.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 373. Id. at 1028; see also Calvin Klein Indus., Inc. v. BFK H.K., Ltd., 714 F. 
Supp. 78, 78–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Accordingly, defendants are preliminarily 
enjoined from selling the infringing goods in the United States, and in such other 
markets as Calvin Klein may demonstrate that it has established its presence, 
through either direct sales or licensees.”). 
 374.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 934 F.3d at 1029. 
 375. Id. at 1031. 
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concept with many types.376 Judges in sanctuary city lawsuits 
seem to be correctly deciding not to grant or approve nationwide 
national government injunctions because local resistance to the 
federal policy differs from locality to locality.377 
Equitable discretion allows the trial judge to evaluate fac-
tual nuance and consider the litigation’s context: “The decision 
to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equita-
ble discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for 
abuse of discretion.”378  
E. Drafting the Injunction 
This Article contends that the major issues in national gov-
ernment injunctions are proof and drafting. The judge must pro-
vide the winning plaintiff or plaintiffs with complete relief with-
out forbidding the defendant from engaging in protected activity. 
There are two ways to reduce the number of the govern-
ment’s agents who must obey an injunction: amending the 
related rule of civil procedure and drafting the injunction. 
Amending the rule is not a good idea. In particular, an amend-
ment to limit federal courts’ orders to “accord with the historical 
practice in federal courts in acting only for the protection of par-
ties to the litigation”379 is inadvisable and wrongheaded. It 
would limit the courts’ remedial power based on the dubious 
analysis of legal history shown earlier in this Article.380 If noth-
ing else, the history is ambiguous. 
The Supreme Court’s remedies decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education381 contributed two ideas that may carry over to 
drafting national government injunctions. First is the idea of 
 
 376. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 1703 (2018). 
 377. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244–45 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (vacating a national government injunction and remanding); Frost, supra 
note 9, at 1102. 
 378. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 379. Letter from Samuel L. Bray, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, to 
Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure (March 1, 2017), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-cv-e-suggestion_bray_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8MRS-SCM4] (proposing an amendment to Rule 65(d) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: “Every order granting an injunction and every restraining 
order must accord with the historical practice in federal courts in acting only for 
the protection of parties to the litigation . . . .”). 
 380.  See Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105; Sohoni, supra note 105. 
 381.  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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possible delay as a result of implementing change in a bureau-
cracy. The Court referred to that as “all deliberate speed.”382 
Second, the Court adjured respect for defendant government of-
ficials.383  
Two examples of types of injunctions that are geographically 
circumscribed show that courts can subject the national govern-
ment injunction to limiting principles to prevent injunctions that 
are too broad. These examples are antisuit injunctions and anti-
trust divestment injunctions. 
An antisuit injunction forbids a litigant from pursuing liti-
gation in another forum. It operates on the defendant—not the 
foreign court—but it does affect the foreign court’s power to act. 
This leads to caution, restrictive rules, and possible dueling in-
junctions. Courts write narrow rules to grant an interstate an-
tisuit injunction. For example, in Tabor & Co. v. McNall the 
court noted that “[t]he trial judge did not cite, nor does the record 
disclose, any facts to show why an injunction is necessary to 
avert ‘fraud, gross wrong or oppression’. Consequently, it was 
error to enjoin the McNalls from proceeding in a foreign 
court.”384 In Wells v. Wells, the court said that the judge’s power 
to enjoin a suit in another state “is a matter of great delicacy 
invoked with great restraint in order to avoid distressing con-
flicts and reciprocal interference with jurisdiction.”385 A court 
will be likely to deny full faith and credit to an out-of-state an-
tisuit injunction.386 
Courts may be even more stingy with international antisuit 
injunctions. For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that several 
other circuits have adopted a “conservative approach”  
under which a foreign antisuit injunction will issue only 
if the movant demonstrates (1) an action in a foreign 
jurisdiction would prevent United States jurisdiction or 
threaten a vital United States policy, and (2) the domes-
tic interests outweigh concerns of international comity. 
Under the conservative approach, “[c]omity dictates 
 
 382.  Id. at 301. 
 383. Id. at 299. 
 384. 333 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
 385. 343 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
 386. Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 241 (1998) (no full 
faith and credit for antisuit injunction). 
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that foreign antisuit injunctions be issued sparingly 
and only in the rarest of cases . . . .”387 
Similarly, judges presiding in antitrust cases must consider 
the breadth of relief and ask whether an injunction is proper 
when it requires the losing defendant to divest. If the plaintiff is 
private, the Department of Justice will weigh in, and the judge 
will consider several factors for an injunction. The judge may 
appoint a special master to monitor and implement a divestment 
injunction.388 
Additionally, a court may limit an injunction to a defined 
territory. One example is an injunction enforcing a former em-
ployee’s activity under a noncompetition covenant that specifies 
a “reasonable” territory.389 Another example is a trademark in-
junction that protects the plaintiff within a particular area.390 
The Ninth Circuit once narrowed a district judge’s nation-
wide national government injunction, vacating the injunction in 
nonplaintiff states and cautioning against broad injunctions.391 
The Fifth Circuit similarly limited an injunction preventing en-
forcement of a federal program to only one state.392 
Courts can develop limiting principles to apply when grant-
ing national government injunctions, and they can draft 
injunctions that are no broader than needed. 
F. Appellate Review 
The final constraint on national government injunctions is 
appellate review—a decision from a more detached, collegial ap-
pellate court. National government injunction plaintiffs will 
 
 387. Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 
F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gua Shan Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 956 F.2d 
1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992)) (internal citations omitted). 
 388. See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 648–51 
(E.D. Va. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-1397 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2019). 
 389. E.g., Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 664–67 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 390. E.g., Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 
415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 391. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575–81 (9th Cir. 2018) (vacating the 
portion of the injunction barring enforcement of rules in nonplaintiff states). But 
see E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(declining to extend Azar and granting the motion for stay pending appeal insofar 
as the injunction applies outside the Ninth Circuit). 
 392. Texas v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(enjoining the United States from enforcing the Guidance in Texas). 
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seek a trial judge that they think will be predisposed to be sym-
pathetic; as critics put it, they will forum shop. From at least 
Chafee on, observers have insisted that a defendant’s proper 
course of action for an objectionable injunction is appellate re-
view, not defiance.393 
Appellate courts review injunctions to determine whether 
there was an abuse of discretion.394 Courts of appeals should re-
view all national government injunctions with a narrower con-
cept of abuse. The trial judge’s discretion when issuing national 
government injunctions should be tempered by stricter stand-
ards than for other injunctions. 
A losing party has a right to appeal both a preliminary in-
junction and a final injunction.395 A full federal appeal with 
briefs, oral argument, and a written decision can take about one 
year, which is too long for the government to wait for an appel-
late decision about a nationwide injunction. 
The government’s lawyers have unleashed a barrage of ver-
tical forum shopping in district courts to secure appellate review 
from a potentially more friendly and perhaps partisan Supreme 
Court majority. Professor Vladeck shows how the government 
has skillfully used appellate procedure to accelerate appellate 
review of trial judges’ nationwide national government injunc-
tion decisions that are usually not subject to review.396 
The government risks losing credibility through excessive 
use of emergency appellate techniques.397 It is like the mythical 
shepherd boy who repeatedly but falsely called “wolf,” later to be 
disbelieved when a wolf actually threatened his flock. Vladeck 
concludes that the mythical lad is not present because the Su-
 
 393. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 353. 
 394. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 395. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1) (2018). 
 396. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 
HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. APP. P. 8 
(interlocutory appeals); id. Rule 5 (accelerated appeals and mandamus); id. Rule 21 
(certiorari before judgment). 
 397. C. Ryan Barber, ‘A Very Difficult Time’: Challenges for Career Lawyers at 
Trump’s DOJ, LAW.COM (July 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law.com
/nationallawjournal/2019/07/15/a-very-difficult-time-challenges-for-career-
lawyers-at-trumps-doj/ [https://perma.cc/4NB7-ZBYC]; Matthew Collette, Draining 
the Reservoir: The Steady Erosion of Credibility at the DOJ, LAW.COM (July 16, 
2019, 5:47 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/16/draining-the-
reservoir-the-steady-erosion-of-credibility-at-the-doj/ [https://perma.cc/L6C9-
WR3X]. 
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preme Court has been open to the government’s persistent 
pressure.398 
Appellate review of nationwide national government injunc-
tions protects the federal government defendant and advances 
the public interest in prompt and, we hope, accurate decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The national government injunction critics have developed 
an inaccurate narrative that has been difficult to dislodge. The 
key to the analysis of nationwide relief is not the people an in-
junction affects. Instead, it is the defendants and their agents 
that injunctions require to obey. When an executive branch de-
fendant’s agents comply with an injunction, as they should, the 
injunction may affect nonparties. 
One way of understanding the critics national government 
injunction’s narrative is as persons advancing an extreme form 
of injunction reform aimed at expanding legislative and execu-
tive power at the expense of the judiciary. Neither the extreme 
left nor the extreme right seem to be at work, however, because 
opposition to nationwide national government injunctions has 
been bipartisan. 
The critics disapprove and seek to circumscribe the federal 
courts’ remedial power to grant broad injunctions against im-
proper executive branch measures. They would dilute the 
federal courts’ traditional judicial review of executive branch 
misconduct through the regular litigation process. The critics’ 
arguments would limit a federal judge’s remedial ability to issue 
a nationwide national government injunction that grants com-
plete relief to wronged plaintiffs and curbs executive branch 
defendants’ misconduct. They overlook the established rule that 
a defendant’s agents must obey an injunction as well as the in 
personam doctrine that an injunction is effective against the de-
fendant beyond the issuing court’s jurisdiction.  
Although these principles apply to other losing defendants, 
the critics favor liberating government defendants. They would 
 
 398. Vladeck, supra note 396. Dissenting from the Court’s decision to stay a 
national government injunction in Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020), 
Justice Sotomayor chided the majority for excessive deference to the executive: “It 
is hard to say what is more troubling: that the Government would seek this 
extraordinary relief seemingly as a matter of course, or that the Court would grant 
it.” Id. at 681.  
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alter the federal government’s practice of obeying injunctions. 
The critics fail to evaluate the principles and filters in equity 
procedure that reduce error and militate against abuse. These 
include the prerequisites for an injunction, the hearing and trial 
process, and the judge’s equitable discretion in drafting an in-
junction. 
The critics’ arguments are unconvincing. The result of ac-
cepting the critics’ critiques would be to change constitutional 
law in two related areas: separation of powers and injunctions. 
It would increase the executive and legislative branches’ power 
at the expense of the judiciary. And it would decrease the judici-
ary’s power to grant injunctions to halt federal government 
lawbreaking and misconduct. The critics’ emphasis on issues 
like percolation and nonparty benefit should not distract atten-
tion from the result of accepting their arguments. 
Other scholars favor nationwide national government in-
junctions with qualifications. Judges, however, should focus on 
providing plaintiffs complete relief without overreaching defend-
ants. They should ignore scholars’ calls for a presumption 
against nationwide orders399 or comparisons of injunctions with 
preclusion and res judicata principles.400 
I will close on a personal note. I have spent a scholarly ca-
reer correcting courts’ blunders, mistakes, and miscues and re-
spectfully suggesting proper paths. This Article, written toward 
my career’s end, however, concludes that the federal district 
judges are getting it right.401 Professors and Trump Administra-
tion officials are trying to divert judges’ attention from the role 
judicial review provides them in enforcing the separation of pow-
ers. That role is to curb unconstitutional and incorrect federal 
executive branch activity and to accord relief to harmed parties. 
Rule of law principles mean that the federal government must 
follow its own Constitution and statutes. The courts have not 
been diverted by critics’ arguments based on lack of authority 
and nonparty “benefit.” The major issues in national govern-
ment injunction litigation fall under the headings of equitable 
jurisdiction and equitable discretion. Other important issues are 
 
 399. Frost, supra note 9, at 1102; Trammell, supra note 9. 
 400. Clopton, supra note 11; Trammell, supra note 9. 
 401. See Suzanna Sherry, Response, A Response to Comments on “Judicial 
Activism”: Liberty’s Safety Net, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 467, 476 (2013) (“I believe that 
federal judges as a group are among the most ethical, professional, and 
disinterested decision-makers we have.”). 
RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2020  5:12 PM 
2020] INJUNCTIONS ON ILLEGAL EXECUTIVE ACTIVITY 975 
the adequacy of plaintiffs’ proof and drafting orders to accom-
plish complete relief for plaintiffs without completely 
disadvantaging defendants. If relief requires nationwide cover-
age, the judge has equitable jurisdiction and equitable discretion 
to grant and draft that order. Putting the critics’ arguments be-
hind us, the federal procedural process includes principles of 
confinement that, applied with a healthy dose of deference to of-
ficial defendants, accomplish those goals. 
